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Two alternative interpretations of  the equilibrium notion employed by Walras in the
Eléments and related writings have been recurrently suggested in the literature: a ‘sta-
tionary’ interpretation and an ‘instantaneous’ (specifically, temporary) one. Such per-
sistent oscillations in the reading of  Walras’s equilibrium concept lead one to suspect
that some ambiguity or inconsistency may possibly exist within Walras’s original
 formulation of  general equilibrium theory. In this paper we explore this conjecture
focussing, in particular, on the relationship between the theory of  the tâtonnement,
regarded by Walras as an essential part of  his overall equilibrium approach, and Wal-
ras’s own interpretation of  the equilibrium concept as employed in the Eléments.
To this end we analyze the evolution of  the tâtonnement construct over the four
editions of  the Eléments published during Walras’s lifetime (1874-1877, 1889, 1896,
1900), separately referring to each of  the four nested equilibrium models (exchange,
production, capital formation, circulation and money) developed by Walras therein.
From our analysis it turns out that either interpretation can indeed be traced back to
Walras’s original treatment of  the tâtonnement process and associated equilibrium
notion in one or the other of  the equilibrium models he puts forward in the various
editions of  the Eléments: specifically, while the ‘instantaneous’ interpretation goes
back to the exchange model, as dealt with in the second (1889) and subsequent
 editions, the ‘stationary’ interpretation is instead grounded in Walras’s theory of  the
tâtonnement process in production, as developed in the second (1889) and third (1896)
editions of  the Eléments. Yet, it is only the ‘instantaneous’ interpretation to pass the
internal consistency test, as Walras himself  eventually realizes in preparing the
fourth (1900) edition of  his work, where in fact only the ‘instantaneous’ (specifically,
temporary) equilibrium notion survives.
1. Introduction
n July 1874 Walras eventually managed to send to press the first in-
stallment of  the first edition of  his magnum opus, the Eléments d’é-
conomie politique pure, a book that was bound to become, in the course
of  time, the source of  one of  the most impressive theoretical construc-
tions in economics, namely, general equilibrium theory (shortly, get).
Yet, more than one hundred and thirty years after that fateful event, and
in spite of  its enduring influence on the subsequent developments of
economic theory, Walras’s own conception of  the way in which the
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working of  a competitive economy should be modelled is still sur-
rounded by a number of  obscurities: in particular, the exact nature of
the equilibrium notion actually employed by Walras in his own version
of  get is still controversial.
Indeed, about one century after the first appearance of  the Eléments,
a consensus apparently emerged among the practitioners of  get con-
cerning the interpretation of  the equilibrium concept originally used
by Walras in his theoretical writings: as a matter of  fact, in the late
1970s and early 1980s, authors conversant with both economic theory
and history of  economic analysis, such as Morishima (1977 and 1980)
and Diewert (1977), forcefully stressed, in the context of  formalized re-
constructions of  Walras’s conception, that the equilibrium notion per-
meating the  Eléments ought to be interpreted as an early, but none the
less sophisticated, instance of  that equilibrium notion that, after Hicks
1939, had come to be referred to as «temporary equilibrium» (Grand-
mont 1982). A few years later, during the 1980s and the 1990s, the tem-
porary equilibrium nature of  Walras’s theory was further clarified,
with particular  reference to its place in the historical evolution of  get,
by van Witteloostuijn and Maks (1988 and 1990), and Donzelli (1990,
1993 and 1997).
Yet, quite recently, when the whole interpretative issue might appear
to have been satisfactorily settled, an alternative interpretation of  Wal-
ras’s theory has made once again its appearance among the students of
get. One interesting instance of  such an alternative interpretation can
be found in Magill and Quinzii (1998), an influential advanced textbook
which, while reviewing the modern analytical developments of  the the-
ory of  incomplete markets, also provides a historical reconstruction,
unusually extensive for contemporary standards, of  the origins of  get.
There we can find the following statement:
Walras (1874) conceived his general equilibrium model as a genuine intertemporal
model, that is, time and capital were to play an essential role. In the end, analytical
difficulties forced him to confine his attention to a special equilibrium, namely a
steady state in which all prices remain unchanged and the sole price linking adjoin-
ing periods is the rate of  interest (Magill and Quinzii 1998, 132).
The idea that Walras’s theory can be (or, better, ought to be) interpret-
ed as either a steady-state or a stationary equilibrium theory is deeply
rooted in the history of  get: as a matter of  fact, such an idea can be
traced back at least to Wicksell 1954 [1893], 164-168, and 1934 [1901], 226,
fn. 1; after that, it has been further adumbrated, albeit with much cau-
tion and a number of  provisoes, by such authorities on Walras’s
thought as Schumpeter 1961 [1912] and Hicks (1934, 346). William Jaffé,
the translator of  Walras’s Eléments into English (Walras 1954), and cer-
tainly one of  the best connoisseurs of  Walras’s works, has occasionally
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ended up by wrongly translating some crucial words or passages (in par-
ticular, the word «statique», which is sometimes mistakenly rendered as
«stationary» (Walras 1954, 269) in order to support his own stationary in-
terpretation of  Walras’s equilibrium theory, an interpretation that is fre-
quently betrayed by Jaffé’s own notes and comments (see, e.g., Walras
1954, 537, 542, 550). Ironically, Jaffé’s occasionally wrong translations have
in turn originated bewilderment and further mistakes in later com-
mentators, such as Collard (1973, 472-473).
As is well-known, however, the most influential source of  the sta-
tionary equilibrium interpretation of  Walras’s theory, at least as far as
the inter-war period is concerned, is represented by Cassel’s textbook,
The Theory of  Social Economy, published in English version in 1932. Even
if  the Eléments are the manifest source of  Cassel’s inspiration, in The
Theory of  Social Economy Walras’s works are nowhere cited. Owing to
this curious omission, Cassel is charged with plagiarism by Wicksell
(1919, 225). Indeed, Wicksell’s charge is partly justified: in fact, from a
purely formal point of  view, the stationary equilibrium model put for-
ward by Cassel in chapter iv of  his book is very similar to the produc-
tion model developed by Walras in Section iv of  the Eléments (Section iii
in the second and third editions). Owing to such similarity, Cassel’s sta-
tionary equilibrium model, soon renamed as the Walras-Cassel model,
was often read as a simplified version of  Walras’s own theory, thereby
concurring to the diffusion and strengthening of  the stationary inter-
pretation of  the latter.
From what has just been said, it appears that, since the publication of
the Eléments, the stationary equilibrium interpretation of  Walras’s the-
ory has exhibited an extraordinary resilience, alternating over time with
the temporary equilibrium interpretation of  the same theory and ef-
fectively competing with the latter for the primacy within the econom-
ics profession. In the light of  this, one is led to suspect that some ambi-
guity or inconsistency may possibly exist within Walras’s original
formulation of  get, or even within the fundamental structure of  get as
such, explaining the persistent oscillations in the interpretation of  Wal-
ras’s equilibrium concept over time.
In the following we intend to explore this conjecture. A natural start-
ing point for such inquiry is represented by the examination of  a special
theory playing a fundamental role in the characterization of  Walras’s
equilibrium notion, namely, the theory of  the tâtonnement. Such a the-
ory, dating back to the very origin of  Walras’s approach, i.e., to the
preparatory writings preceding the publication of  the first edition of
the Eléments, is regarded by Walras as an essential part of  his equilibri-
um theory, as he repeats over and over again in a number of  letters to
his followers and scientific correspondents ( Jaffé 1965, vol. ii, 364, 370,
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385, 387, 404). Yet, Walras will never be fully satisfied with his own
 handling of  this issue: in fact, the theory of  the tâtonnement is probably
the part of  the Eléments which goes through the most frequent and rad-
ical revisions over the years. However, Walras’s unremitting efforts
notwithstanding, the treatment of  the tâtonnement remains obscure,
self-contradictory and, on some occasions, definitely wrong in all the
editions of  the Eléments.
Controversy over this theory has been long-lasting and extensive.
With his review of  the second edition of  the Eléments in 1889, Edge-
worth starts a series of  three notes, critically commenting upon vari-
ous aspects of  Walras’s theory, among which the theory of  the tâton-
nement has the right of  place (Edgeworth 1889a, 1889b, 1891); more than
three decades later, Edgeworth (1925, vol. ii, 310-312) will come back
once again to the same topic. Spurred by Walras himself, who is seri-
ously annoyed by Edgeworth’s attacks to the theory of  the tâtonnement
and is looking for a possible advocate of  his own theoretical approach
( Jaffé 1965, vol. ii, 364), Bortkiewicz (1890, 358-359) counteracts Edge-
worth’s initial criticisms, developing what will become the standard
 reply to the objections concerning the tâtonnement in the small com-
munity of  Walras’s followers; in fact, a few years later Pareto 1964 [1896-
1897], 24-25, in taking Walras’s part in the tâtonnement controversy, will
embrace Bortkiewicz’s line of  defence without any change. Yet, if
Edgeworth’s 1889 review of  the second edition of  the Eléments is the
first published paper where Walras’s theory of  the tâtonnement is ex-
plicitly criticized, it is actually Bertrand’s 1883 review-article of  Walras’s
Théorie mathématique de la richesse sociale which opens the fire against
the substance (if  not the name, since the word tâtonnement is nowhere
mentioned in Bertrand’s paper) of  Walras’s treatment of  the equilibra-
tion process.
Half  a century after Bertrand’s early attack, very similar questions
concerning Walras’s tâtonnement theory are raised by Hicks (1934, 342-
343), who will thereafter repeatedly come back to the same issue in his
later writings. After Hicks’s rediscovery of  the tâtonnement story in the
mid-1930s, the debate about the reconstruction and possible formaliza-
tion of  such highly controversial part of  Walras’s theory tends to spread
everywhere and to become endemic. Just to mention a few authors who
have been directly concerned with the interpretation of  Walras’s tâton-
nement theory, we may recall the following: Jaffé 1935, 1954, 1965, 1967,
1980, 1981; Lange 1944, esp. 94-97; Goodwin 1951, 1953; Patinkin 1956, esp.
377-385, and 1965, esp. 531-540; Uzawa 1960; Newman 1965, 101-103; Walk-
er 1970, 1972, 1987a, 1987b, 1988, 1996; Arrow and Hahn 1971, esp. 263-323;
Morishima 1977, esp. 27-45, and 1980; Varian 1984, 244-249; Huck 2001;
Bridel and Huck 2002a, 2002b; Rebeyrol 2002; Costa 2002.
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The whole debate is full of  conflicting views and rich in coups de
théâtre, including a few unexpected recantations of  the positions previ-
ously held by some authoritative interpreters of  Walras’s approach: of
the latter, in fact, we count at least three, starting from Hicks’s unex-
plained change of  mind about the true meaning of  Walras’s original as-
sumptions  concerning the tâtonnement (Hicks 1939, 128, and 1976, 151), to
arrive at Jaffé’s (1981, 315-316) and Walker’s (1988, 306) explicit recogni-
tions that some of  the claims they had previously made about Walras’s
analysis of  the adjustment process were mistaken. Yet, in spite of  the
duration of  the controversy and the variety of  the stances advocated
therein, to the best of  our knowledge none of  the participants in this
apparently never-ending hermeneutical and theoretical exercise has
ever suggested that there might exist some connection between the un-
certain epistemological  status of  Walras’s theory of  tâtonnement and the
similarly dubious status of  the equilibrium notion employed by the
same author and his followers. It is our intention to fill this gap in the
literature.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, after surveying the
main steps in the evolution of  Walras’s theoretical ideas and reviewing
the intricate vicissitudes of  the various editions of  the Eléments and re-
lated works, we shall focus on the peculiar structure of  Walras’s theo-
retical system, which is made up of  four nested equilibrium models,
arranged in order of  increasing scope and usually referred to as the mod-
els of  exchange, production, capital formation, and circulation and
money (the last model being introduced only in the fourth edition of  the
Eléments). Further, after explaining what Walras exactly means by ‘solv-
ing’ each one of  these models, we shall investigate the relationships be-
tween what Walras regards as the two constituent ‘halves’ of  equilibri-
um theory: the ‘mathematical’ or ‘theoretical’ solution, provided by a
model in equational form satisfying certain determinacy requirements,
on the one hand, and the ‘practical’ or ‘empirical’ solution, directly pro-
vided by the market by means of  the tâtonnement process, on the other.
Sections 3, 4, and 5 will analyze Walras’s treatment of  equilibrium and
tâtonnement in the models of  exchange, production, and capital forma-
tion, respectively, with exclusive reference to the first two editions of
the Eléments and the other writings of  the same period (1874-1889). Sec-
tion 3, in particular, will focus on the exchange model. In this regard, we
shall first specify the ‘Walrasian rule of  price adjustment’, underlying
the tâtonnement process in exchange. Then we shall show that, after a
relatively imprecise and realistically naïve handling of  the disequilibri-
um process in the first edition, paving the way to alternative and con-
tradictory interpretations of  the tâtonnement in exchange, Walras makes
the analysis much more precise in the second edition, by explicitly in-
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troducing a ‘no trade out of  equilibrium’ assumption. The final out-
come is that the tâtonnement becomes a virtual process, where no ob-
servable disequilibrium behavior is allowed; hence, while the tâton-
nement in exchange must be supposed to take place in a purely ‘logical’
time, distinct from the ‘real’ time over which the economy evolves, the
associated equilibrium, supposedly reached in one single instant of  ‘re-
al’ time, becomes ‘instantaneous’ in nature.
Section 4 will examine Walras’s treatment of  equilibrium and tâton-
nement in the production model in the first two editions of  the Eléments.
In this regard, after specifying the ‘Walrasian rule of  quantity adjust-
ment’, underlying the tâtonnement process in production, we shall show
that, over the whole period under discussion, and even beyond, Walras
keeps to the assumption that disequilibrium production entails observ-
able behavior, taking place in ‘real’ time and producing actual conse-
quences. This assumption, which cannot be easily reconciled with the
coexisting treatment of  the tâtonnement process in exchange, gives also
rise to further specific difficulties, which Walras desperately endeavors
to face: to this end, in the first edition he makes the unpalatable as-
sumption of  a ‘foreign market’, accommodating all ‘domestic’ quanti-
tative disequilibrium; in the second edition, instead, while giving up all
recourse to an external deus ex machina, he resorts to the alternative as-
sumption of  a stationary economy, identically repeating itself  period af-
ter period under unchanging conditions. When applied to the produc-
tion model, this assumption gives rise to the prototype of  the stationary
equilibrium model, later resumed under the species of  the Walras-Cas-
sel model, on which the stationary interpretation of  Walras’s equilibri-
um theory is actually founded. Yet, when applied to the capital forma-
tion model, as Walras tries to do, the stationarity assumption turns out
to be self-contradictory, as we shall show in section 5.
Section 6 will examine Walras’s final stance on equilibrium and tâ-
tonnement, as can be found in the fourth edition of  the Eléments (1900).
We shall show that in this edition Walras, in trying to remedy the diffi-
culties and contradictions engendered by his previous treatment of  the
tâtonnement process in production, introduces a new assumption,
known as the «hypothèse des bons», with the purpose of  extending to
the tâtonnement in production those same features (virtuality, unob-
servability, evolution in a merely ‘logical’ time set) that had been char-
acterizing the tâtonnement in exchange for a long time, namely, since the
second edition of  the Eléments. In this new context, all stationarity as-
sumptions can and must be dropped, so that the equilibrium notion
emerging from a generalized virtual tâtonnement process, in both ex-
change and production, cannot but be of  the ‘instantaneous’, specifi-
cally ‘temporary’, type. Section 7 concludes.
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2. The structure of the Eléments:
Walras’s nested equilibrium models
and the twofold concept of ‘solution’
During Walras’s lifetime, four successive editions of  the Eléments were
sent to press: the first one, subdivided into two installments, appeared
in 1874 and 1877; the second, third, and fourth editions, instead, were
each published as a unitary volume in 1889, 1896, and 1900, respectively.
There was also a posthumous edition, arranged by Walras himself  be-
fore his death, which was published in 1926; this edition, known in the
past as the «quatrième édition définitive», is now more simply indicated
as the fifth edition. The second and third editions present only minor
differences, which (barring one exception, to be mentioned in due time)
are irrelevant for our present purposes. The fourth and fifth editions are
almost indistinguishable. Hence, for our purposes it will be enough to
focus attention on the first, second, and fourth editions only.1
Apart from the Eléments, occasionally it will be necessary to refer to
other writings, whose drafting is strictly intertwined with that of  the
Eléments. In particular, the content of  the first edition of  the Eléments
partially overlaps with the content of  four mémoires, separately written
and published in the bulletins of  learned societies, after presentation by
Walras of  the corresponding texts at public meetings of  the same soci-
eties. Of  the two mémoires partly covering the topics dealt with in the
first installment of  the first edition, only the first one («Principe d’une
théorie mathématique de l’échange», January 1874) was actually pub-
lished before the appearance, in July 1874, of  the first installment of  the
first edition, thereby becoming the first published instance of  Walras’s
equilibrium theory; the second («Equations de l’échange») appeared
 only in October 1876. The other two mémoires, «Equations de la pro-
duction» and «Equations de la capitalisation», partly covering the topics
dealt with in the second installment of  the first edition, appeared in Oc-
tober 1876 and March 1877, respectively. In 1877 the four mémoires were
collected by Walras in a brochure, which was given the title of  Théorie
mathématique de la richesse sociale. This brochure was reprinted in 1883,
under the same title, in a revised and augmented version, containing
1 Since a variorum edition of  the Eléments is now available, allowing easy comparisons
among the texts of  the various editions, all the quotations will refer to this edition, contained
in vol. viii of  the Œuvres économiques complètes d’Auguste et de Léon Walras, published in 1988.
Page and edition references will be given in the following way: Walras 1988, page number(s),
number(s) of  the edition(s) involved; if  no edition number is specified, this means that the text
quoted has remained unaltered over all the editions. Jaffé’s English edition (Walras 1954),
though a valuable tool for scholars and historians, is frequently unreliable, for the reasons men-
tioned in the introduction.
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three more mémoires, written in the meanwhile.1 Finally, we shall have
occasion to mention two further papers, separately written and pub-
lished in 1891 and 1892, respectively, which were later on merged, with
some revisions, in a single text, appearing under the title «Théorie
géométrique de la détermination des prix» as «Appendice i» of  the third
and following editions of  the Eléments.2
In elaborating his theoretical system, Walras adopts a particular con-
structive and expository method, partly surviving in the subsequent
evolution of  get. Walras’s method consists in formulating a number of
equilibrium models, arranged in order of  increasing descriptive reach:
the models are nested in the sense that the scope of  each model is wider
than the scope exhibited by the previous one (if  any) in the sequence.
Three models are fully developed in all the editions of  the Eléments, as
well as in the four mémoires mentioned above: a model of  exchange,
dealing first with the problem of  the exchange of  two commodities
(consumers’ goods) for one another, and then of  any finite number of
commodities for each other; a model of  production, containing the pre-
vious model (in a sense to be qualified) and further dealing with the
problem of  the transformation of  productive services into consumers’
goods; and finally a model of  capital formation, containing the previous
model (still in a sense to be qualified) and further dealing with the prob-
lem of  the transformation of  productive services into newly produced
durable capital goods. The structure of  these three models, as well as
the mutual relations among them, remain basically unaltered in all the
editions of  the Eléments, as Walras himself  underlines in the preface to
the fourth edition (1988, 5, 4-5). In the fourth edition, however, one can
also find a fourth model which, in addition to the problems already tack-
led in the third, also deals with circulating capital and money. Money
had already been discussed at length in all the previous editions, but on-
ly in the fourth one, as Walras once again underlines in the correspon-
ding Preface (1988, 8-9, 4-5), an attempt is made to integrate the issues
concerning money into the main formal apparatus of  the theory.
Walras’s purpose is to ‘solve’ each one of  the above equilibrium mod-
els. But for Walras ‘solving’ a formal model implies a special two-step
procedure, which is well illustrated by the following passage:
1 This latter work, which encompasses, with minor textual revisions, all the mémoires, as
well as the 1877 brochure, is now available in vol. xi of  the Œuvres économiques complètes d’Au-
guste et de Léon Walras, published in 1993. When quoting from the various mémoires, the 1877
brochure or the 1883 collection, we shall identify the original source of  the quotation by spec-
ifying the year of  first publication of  the corresponding text; page numbers, anyhow, will al-
ways refer to the pagination of  vol. xi of  the Œuvres économiques complètes d’Auguste et de Léon
Walras, where all the above materials can be found in a critical variorum edition.
2 When quoting from this text, we shall refer to the variorum edition of  the Eléments, i.e., to
Walras 1988, adopting the conventions already specified at p. 91, fn. 1.
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Or, pour démontrer que des prix de marchandises, qui sont des quantités, résultent
effectivement de telles ou telles données ou conditions, il est absolument indispen-
sable à mon sens: 1º de formuler, d’après ces données ou conditions, un système
d’équations, en nombre rigoureusement égal à celui des inconnues, dont les quanti-
tés en question soient les racines, et 2º d’établir que l’enchaînement des phénomènes
de la réalité constitue bien la résolution empirique de ce système d’équations. C’est
ce que j’ai fait en ce qui concernait successivement l’échange, la production et la ca-
pitalisation.1
As can be seen, ‘solving’ a model in Walras’s sense entails satisfying two
distinct requirements, each implying a specific step. Let us consider the
first step first.
Given an economic problem, identified by certain ‘data’ or ‘condi-
tions’ and certain ‘unknowns’, a formal model of  the problem can be
constructed by specifying a system of  equations, suitably embodying
the given ‘data’ and ‘conditions’ (parameters, functions, relations); fur-
ther, the number of  the equations must be rigorously equal to the num-
ber of  the unknowns. Apparently, according to what Walras seems to
suggest on a number of  occasions, such equality is enough to provide
the «solution théorique et mathématique» or the «solution scientifique»
of  the problem or, more precisely, of  the model representing it (1988,
93, 307, 375; 1988, 189, 2-5; 1988, 461, 4-5). But how Walras’s statements
should be interpreted is not perfectly clear.
Sometimes, by insisting on the equation counting procedure, Walras
seems to imply that the ascertained equality between the number of  the
equations and the number of  the unknowns of  a particular model is
enough to ensure the determinateness of  the model, hence the exis-
tence, and even the uniqueness, of  a solution to the system of  equations
representing it. Yet, this reading of  Walras’s statements is disproved by
the following simple observation: Walras explicitly allows for the possi-
bility that a model, which satisfies the equation counting requirement,
either admits of  no solution (1988, 96-97) or, on the contrary, has mul-
tiple solutions (1988, 97). But even this remark needs further qualifica-
tion. On the one hand, what Walras interprets as a situation where no
solution exists would be read nowadays as a situation where the model
exhibits a perfectly admissible solution (namely, a trivial no-trade equi-
librium). On the other, he tends to restrict the possibility of  multiple
equilibria to the elementary case of  the exchange of  two commodities
for one another, belittling the probability of  such occurrence in more
1 Walras 1988, 651. The omission of  money in the above list of  topics and corresponding
models is simply due to the fact that the quoted passage dates back to the first edition of  the
Eléments, remaining unaltered thereafter; hence, it was written at a time when money had not
yet become the object of  a formal model, calling for a ‘solution’ in Walras’s sense.
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complex situations, such as the case of  the exchange of  many com-
modities for each other (1988, 242); further, even when the possibility of
multiple solutions is allowed for, their number is always assumed to be
finite, so that the solutions are locally unique.
To conclude on this point, Walras’s prevailing stance on the first step
of  his own ‘solution’ procedure, the step which is supposed to provide
the «solution théorique et mathématique» of  the equilibrium model un-
der question, may be summarized as follows: given a model represent-
ed by a system of  equations, if  the number of  the equations is equal to
the number of  the unknowns, then the model is determinate, which im-
plies that 1) a solution exists (allowing also for the trivial solutions of  the
no-trade type), and 2) either there exists a unique solution, or there ex-
ist finitely many solutions, which are therefore locally unique. This
proposition is never proved by Walras, and of  course, as will become
clear since the mid-1930s, it cannot be proved without further specific
assumptions. Yet Walras consistently behaves in the Eléments as if  it
were a proven theorem. But this is not enough from Walras’s point of
view, since the ‘solution’ procedure can be regarded as complete only if
the first step is supplemented by the second one.
Before turning to the second step, however, we can take advantage of
the preceding discussion to clarify in which sense, and within which lim-
its, the sequence of  Walras’s four models should be regarded as nested.
Given the equational approach taken by Walras, each of  the four mod-
els is described by a system of  equations, equal in number to the vari-
ables considered therein. Hence, when one passes from a smaller mod-
el in the sequence to a larger one (if  any such model exists), the number
of  the equations describing the model should increase by as much as the
number of  the new variables considered therein. In this sense the larger
model can be said to contain the smaller. But it would be a serious mis-
take to think that the larger system of  equations, describing the larger
model, can be obtained by simply adding new equations, equal in num-
ber to the newly introduced variables, to the smaller system of  equa-
tions, which can be left unchanged otherwise: for, owing to the general
interrelation among all the variables, which is after all the distinguishing
feature of  get, the introduction of  new variables is generally bound to
affect some of  the functions and relations entering the smaller system
of  equations, which cannot therefore remain unchanged.
Walras, being the founder of  get, is of  course aware of  the analytical
problems posed by the interrelation among all the variables of  the econ-
omy. Yet, he is frequently tempted by the short cut neatly described in
the following passage:
Théoriquement, toutes les inconnues du problème économique dépendent de toutes
les équations de l’équilibre économique. Toutefois, même au point de vue statique
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et théorique, il est bien permis de considérer certaines de ces inconnues comme dé-
pendant plus spécialement des équations qui s’introduisent avec elles dans le pro-
blème pour les déterminer. Et à bien plus fort raison a-t-on ce droit quand on passe
du point de vue statique au point de vue dynamique.
(Walras 1988, 430, 4-5)
In effect, as we shall see in section 4 below, Walras often appears to yield
to the above temptation in discussing the ‘solution’ of  the production
model: in fact, given that the production model ‘contains’ in some sense
the exchange model,1 Walras is often led to consider the equations of
the exchange model as if  they were not only separable from the larger
system of  equations describing the production model, but also inde-
pendently solvable; but this is a mistake, giving rise to momentous con-
sequences.2
Let us now turn to the second step in Walras’s ‘solution’ procedure.
To clarify the meaning of  the second step, as well as its relationship with
the first, it may be useful to quote a passage to be found towards the end
of  Leçon 6 of  the Eléments, where Walras presents the ‘solution’ of  the
problem of  the exchange of  two commodities for one another, the sim-
plest problem tackled in Walras’s theoretical system and, consequently,
the first problem to which Walras’s ‘solution’ procedure is applied in the
Eléments. The ‘solution’ of  this problem, referred to by Walras (1988, 93)
as the «loi de l’offre et de la demande effectives» or the «loi d’établisse-
ment des prix d’équilibre», is expressed as follows:
Deux marchandises étant données, pour qu’il y ait équilibre du marché à leur égard,
ou prix stationnaire de l’une en l’autre, il faut et il suffit que la demande effective de
chacune de ces deux marchandises soit égale à son offre effective. Lorsque cette égal-
ité n’existe pas, il faut, pour arriver au prix d’équilibre, une hausse du prix de la
marchandise dont la demande effective est supérieure à l’offre effective, et une baisse
du prix de celle dont l’offre effective est supérieure à la demande effective.
In the simple problem under discussion, one can define two reciprocal
relative prices, one for either commodity in terms of  the other; hence
there is only one unknown independent price variable, namely, either
relative price (arbitrarily chosen). In this case, therefore, the first re-
quirement for a ‘solution’ in Walras’s sense is satisfied by positing one
single equation, namely, the market-clearing equation obtained by
1 As Walras 1988, 283 himself  writes: «L’état d’équilibre de la production, contenant im-
plicitement l’état d’équilibre de l’échange, est à présent facile à définir».
2 As we shall see in section 4, a similar, but even more serious, problem arises in connection
with Walras’s discussion of  the tâtonnement in the production model, where he de facto regards
the dynamic equations governing the adjustment process in exchange as separable from the
dynamic equations governing the adjustment process in production. Analogous problems arise
also in connection with the capital formation model (see, in particular, Walras 1988, 430 ff., 4-
5) and the model of  circulation and money (see, in particular, ibidem, 465 ff., 4-5). On the sepa-
rability issue in the latter model, see also Patinkin’s motivated criticism (1965, 558-572).
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equalling the aggregate demand for either commodity with the aggre-
gate supply of  the same commodity (the market-clearing equation rel-
ative to the other commodity being then necessarily satisfied, as Walras
elsewhere proves). Hence, the first sentence in the above quoted pas-
sage summarizes the first step in Walras’s ‘solution’ procedure, provid-
ing the «solution théorique et mathématique» of  the problem; the sec-
ond sentence, instead, summarizes the second step in the procedure,
providing the «solution pratique» or the «résolution empirique» of  the
same problem (1988, 93, 307, 375; 1988, 189, 2-5; 1988, 461, 4-5).
The second sentence states what might rightfully be called the «Wal-
rasian rule of  price adjustment», according to which the price of  a com-
modity changes over time if  and only if  the market for that commodi-
ty does not clear, the rate of  change in the price being a sign-preserving
function of  the aggregate excess demand for the commodity in ques-
tion. Since, in the case under discussion, the excess demand for either
commodity is a function of  the only independent price variable, name-
ly, the arbitrarily selected relative price, in this case the Walrasian price
adjustment rule defines a simple dynamical system, consisting in one
functional equation in which the state (or adjustment) variable consists
precisely in the selected relative price. The precise nature of  the time set
over which the dynamical system evolves cannot be discussed at this
stage; this crucial issue will be taken up in detail in following sections.
The process engendered by this dynamical system represents the sim-
plest form of  tâtonnement process, namely, the form appropriate to the
elementary problem under discussion; but, in spite of  its simplicity, this
introductory example embodies the essential features of  Walras’s tâ-
tonnement in the more complex models as well (Walras 1988, 189, 2-5;
1988, 698, 3-5). In particular, here as elsewhere in the Eléments, it is pre-
cisely the theory of  the tâtonnement that represents the second step in
Walras’s ‘solution’ procedure, for it is the tâtonnement process that pro-
vides that «solution pratique» or «empirique», identical with the «solu-
tion théorique et mathématique», which fulfils the second requirement
of  Walras’s methodology.
The relationship between the two solutions, the «théorique» and the
«pratique», is well illustrated by the following passage (Walras 1988, 93),
whose import certainly transcends the simple case to which it con-
cretely refers:
On voit clairement à présent ce qu’est le mécanisme de la concurrence sur le mar-
ché; c’est la solution pratique, et par hausse et baisse des prix, du problème de
l’échange dont nous avons fourni la solution théorique et mathématique. On doit
comprendre d’ailleurs que notre intention n’est aucunement de substituer une solu-
tion à l’autre. La solution pratique est d’une rapidité et d’une sûreté qui ne laissent
rien à désirer. On peut voir, sur de grands marchés fonctionnant même sans courtiers
ni crieurs, le prix courant d’équilibre se déterminer en quelques minutes, et des quan-
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tités considérables de marchandise s’échanger à ce prix en deux ou trois quarts
d’heure. Au contraire, la solution théorique serait, dans presque tous les cas, absolu-
ment impraticable.
The main reason why, according to Walras, the mathematical solu-
tion cannot be computed is that the theorist does not actually know
the data of  the problem under question. But this limitation is not re-
ally relevant, for the analytical solution of  the system of  equations
describing a particular model is not the real purpose of  the theory,
whose aim is rather to clarify the general principle governing the de-
termination of  equilibrium prices and quantities (ibidem). On the oth-
er hand, even if  the analytical solution could actually be computed,
there would be no point in calculating it, since the practical solution
provided by the market is reached no less quickly and precisely than
any analytical solution.1
However, the practical solution provided by the market can be re-
garded as a sufficient ‘solution’ of  the overall problem only if  it co-
incides with the theoretical solution: for only in the case of  identity
between the two solutions can the practical one be taken as an effi-
cient substitute for the other. What needs then to be done «pour
établir que la solution théorique et la solution du marché sont iden-
tiques» (Walras 1988, 189, 2-5)? In principle, what ought to be proved
is that the dynamical system describing the adjustment process con-
verges to an equilibrium (in the sense of  dynamical systems theory)
which coincides with either the unique solution of  the system of
equations describing the model, or one of  the finitely many solutions
of  the same system of  equations (which of  the solutions the process
converges to depending in this case on the initial conditions). Such a
proof, however, can be conveniently split into two steps: first, one
ought to prove that the adjustment process does not change the da-
ta (parameters, functions, relations) of  the economy; second, one
ought to prove that either the unique solution is a globally asymp-
totically stable equilibrium, with respect to the specified dynamical
process, or each of  the finitely many solutions is an asymptotically
stable equilibrium, with respect to the specified dynamical process,
for appropriately given initial conditions.
1 In his first mémoire, Walras 1874, 37 takes a more optimistic view about both the mathe-
matical solvability of  the exchange problem and the precision, though not the speed, of  the an-
alytical solution: «A priori, ce problème est évidemment soluble, du moins en principe, par le
procédé mathématique, comme il est soluble, en fait, sur le marché, par le procédé empirique
de la hausse et de la baisse». In particular, supposing that all the necessary information about
the data of  the problem may be conveyed to a «calculateur», then «ce calculateur déterminera
le prix d’équilibre non pas certes aussi rapidement, mais à coup sûr plus rigoureusement que
cela ne pourrait se faire par le mécanisme de la hausse et de la baisse».
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As to the change in the data, Walras is aware of  the need to avoid its
occurrence during the tâtonnement process. The assumptions he makes
to this end will be discussed in the following sections.
As to the stability of  the solution(s) with respect to the specified
 dynamical process, Walras once again is aware that a formal proof  is
needed, but his treatment remains highly unsatisfactory in all the edi-
tions of  the Eléments. Postponing a more detailed discussion of  this issue
to the following sections, we confine ourselves here to considering the
simplest possible case for illustrative purposes. In the case of  the ex-
change of  two commodities for one another, Walras’s ‘proof ’ simply
consists in observing that, starting from any initial condition (a price «crié
au hasard»), hence from a corresponding value of  the excess demand
function, the ‘Walrasian price adjustment rule’ is bound to produce the
‘right’ change in price, namely, a change reducing the value of  the excess
demand in the next round of  tâtonnement, not only in the case of  a unique
equilibrium, but also in the case of  any stable equilibrium (in Walras’s
sense), when the equilibria are more than one (Walras 1988, 98-99).
This observation is certainly not a proof  of  the convergence of  the
tâtonnement process to equilibrium in the simple case under considera-
tion. But even less satisfactory are the alleged ‘proofs’ put forward by
Walras in relation to the other more complex cases and models. In 1884
a critical remark in a letter received from Wicksteed ( Jaffé 1965, vol. ii,
16-18) reveals to Walras the defective character of  his ‘proof ’ of  conver-
gence to equilibrium of  the tâtonnement process in exchange (of  finite-
ly many commodities for each other) and in production. After taking
due notice of  Wicksteed’s observation ( Jaffé 1965, vol. ii, 24-26), Walras
revises all the passages of  the first edition of  the Eléments where he had
boldly claimed the «certain» convergence of  the tâtonnement process to
the «solution théorique»: in the light of  his more mature reflections,
since the second edition he replaces the demanding term «certain» with
the less compromising term «probable» (Walras 1988, 195, 326, 328, 2-5;
1988, 698, 3-5).
But this weakening of  his previous confidence does not lead Walras
to change his mind as to the need of  supplementing the «solution
théorique» of  each particular model with the «solution pratique» pro-
vided by the appropriate tâtonnement: in fact, in all the editions of  the
Eléments, an almost standardized formula, repeated over and over again,
confirms such a need with reference not only, as we have already seen,
to the model of  exchange of  two (Walras 1988, 93) and then finitely
many (189, 2-5) commodities for each other, but also to the models of
production (307), capital formation (375), and finally circulation and
money (461, 4-5). The relation between the two kinds of  ‘solutions’, the
«théorique» and the «pratique», or between equilibrium theory and the
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theory of  the tâtonnement, still remains at the center of  Walras’s theo-
retical thought. And to the analysis of  this relation in the various equi-
librium models we now turn, focussing first of  all on the two related as-
pects whose discussion has been deliberately postponed: the nature of
the time set over which the tâtonnement process is supposed to take
place and the nature of  the assumptions made by Walras to ensure the
invariance of  the economic data during the tâtonnement.
3. Equilibrium and tâtonnement in the first two editions
of the Eléments: pure exchange
This section and the following three will analyse the relationship be-
tween the equilibrium concept and the tâtonnement construct, fo-
cussing on the evolution of  Walras’s ideas over the various editions of
the Eléments and related writings. Sections 3, 4 and 5 will examine the
changes in Walras’s ideas on equilibrium and tâtonnement occurring be-
tween the first and the second edition of  the Eléments, that is, between
1874 and 1889 (with a marginal extension to the following two years):
in particular, section 3 will concentrate on the exchange model, section
4 on the production model, while section 5 will be devoted to the mod-
el of  capital formation. Section 6, instead, will examine the final
changes in Walras’s conception concerning equilibrium and tâton-
nement introduced in 1900, with the appearance of  the fourth edition
of  the Eléments.
Let us then start from the exchange model. Let us suppose that in the
exchange economy under question (or in the ‘market’ under question,
to use Walras’s prevailing expression) there are I traders, who are also
consumers, indexed by i=1, …, I, where 2 I<. The traders exchange
quantities of  L perfectly divisible commodities, to be regarded as con-
sumers’ goods in this model, indexed by l=1, …, L, where 2L<.  L
is the commodity space.
Each trader i is characterized by: a consumption set Xi ={xi}=  L+,
where xi is a consumption plan, or simply a consumption, possible for
i; a utility function ui : Xi→  ; an endowment ˆci ∈ L+\{0}, where the
superscript c stands for ‘consumers’ goods’ (a different sort of  endow-
ment will be defined in the next section, in examining the production
model). Given xi ∈ Xi, (xi – ˆci) ∈ L is a trade plan, or simply a trade,
possible for trader i. Walras makes a number of  specific assumptions on
the characteristics of  the traders, which do not occasionally satisfy con-
temporary standards of  rigor or generality. However, since Walras’s
most questionable original assumptions on traders’ characteristics are
actually irrelevant for achieving his own results, they will be dispensed
with in the following; on the contrary, we shall feel free to make all
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those assumptions that subsequent theoretical developments have
proved to be necessary in order to justify some results taken for grant-
ed by Walras.1 Summing up, therefore, the data of  the exchange econ-
omy consist in an I – tuple of  characteristics (Xi, ui(·), ˆci)i=1,…,i.
For most of  the following discussion it will be enough to confine our
attention to an economy with only two commodities. Hence, in order
to simplify the exposition, and following for that matter Walras’s own
lead, let us provisionally assume L=2.
Then let p = (p1, p2) ∈ L++ be the price system, where the commodi-
ty prices, expressed in units of  account, are assumed always to be  strictly
positive (prices can be bounded away from zero by making some
 desirability assumption on the utility functions). From this we get p12 ≡
p1–p2
≡
1–p21, the relative price of commodity 1 in terms of commodity 2, p21
 being the reciprocal relative price of commodity 2 in terms of com-
modity 1. Since p12 and p21 are not independent of one another, we can
and must focus attention on one of them only. Then, let us select p12 for
 consideration; that price will be called for short ‘the relative price’ in the
following.
Traders are assumed ‘to behave competitively’: this means that, in
choosing a consumption or trade plan, they are supposed to take prices
(or, in this model, the relative price) as given. Since, in making their
choices, traders take prices as given parameters, they are said to be
price-takers and to be characterized by a sort of  rationality which is of-
ten labelled as ‘parametric’. Traders are also assumed to maximize their
utility functions, subject to their budget constraints. Hence, given the





p12 x1i + x2i = p12ˆc1i +ˆc2i
Let us assume, for simplicity, that trader i’s characteristics are so speci-
fied that, ∀p12 ∈++, the optimization problem has a unique solution,
x1 (p12) ∈2+. The function xi : ++ → 2+ is trader i’s demand function,
while the function zi ≡ xi – ˆc1 : ++→ 2 is i’s excess demand function.
Let ˆc ≡ ™ ii=1 ˆc1 be the aggregate endowments (of consumers’ goods)
of the economy; further, let x (·) ≡ ™ ii=1 xi (·) and z (·) ≡ ™ 
i
i=1 zi (·) ≡
1 In particular, we shall dispose of  Walras’s inessential assumption that the traders’ utility
functions be additively separable in their arguments; on the contrary, we shall assume all those
properties of  preferences (such as strict convexity) which are required to generate well-defined
individual excess demand functions.
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x (·) – ˆc be the aggregate demand and the aggregate excess demand
function, respectively. Of  course, the aggregate demand and excess de-
mand functions, as well as the aggregate endowment vector, can be
written coordinatewise as follows: x (·) ≡ (x1 (·), x2 (·)), z (·) ≡ (z1 (·), z2 (·)),
and ˆc ≡ (ˆc1, ˆc2).
An equilibrium relative price, p*12, is then a root of the following mar-
ket-clearing equation for commodity 1:
z1 (p*12) = x1 (p*12) – ˆc1 = 0,
the market-clearing equation for commodity 2 being necessarily satis-
fied, in view of  the budget constraints assumed to hold in the traders’
optimization problems, when the equation for commodity 1 is satisfied.
Positing the equation allows the theorist to define the equilibrium con-
cept appropriate to the exchange model at hand, thereby providing
what Walras calls the «solution théorique et mathématique» of  the cor-
responding problem. But this is not enough for Walras, since for him
the theorist is also required to explain how an equilibrium is actually
reached or ‘established’ in the market; to this end, one has to resort to
the theory of  the tâtonnement, which provides the «solution pratique»
or «empirique» of  the problem. As we have already seen, in this ele-
mentary case the process is governed by the simplest possible applica-
tion of  the ‘Walrasian rule of  price adjustment’, according to which the
adjustment variable, namely, the relative price p12, starting from a value
which is randomly quoted («crié au hazard») at the beginning of the
process, rises or falls over a suitably specified time set according to
whether the excess demand for commodity 1 as a function of  the rela-
tive price, z1 (p12), is greater or less than zero.
From the very beginning of  his scientific activity, Walras is firmly con-
vinced that the ‘Walrasian rule of  price adjustment’, governing the tâ-
tonnement process in the exchange model, is a natural, almost self-evi-
dent, and basically irreplaceable formalization of  the way in which any
real-world competitive market actually operates in the establishment of
a competitive equilibrium. Moreover, he does not lay any particular
claim concerning the novelty or the originality of  his own theory of  the
tâtonnement in exchange, convinced as he is that such a theory is noth-
ing but an embellished and slightly more formalized version of  the old
classical idea, already discussed at length by, e.g., J. S. Mill, of  the price
adjustment process in a competitive market. As a matter of  fact, when
Edgeworth (1889a, 268), in his review of  the second edition of  the Elé-
ments, attacks the Walrasian theory of  the tâtonnement by asserting that
«Prof. Walras’s laboured lessons indicate a way, not the way, of  descent
to equilibrium», Walras’s immediate reaction is one of  true astonish-
ment, since he cannot believe that any unprejudiced person may ever
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call into question either the general validity, or the realistic foundation
of  his approach.1
Walras’s naïve realistic epistemology, at least as far as the tâtonnement
process is concerned, while promptly embraced by Bortkiewicz2 and
Pareto 1964 [1896-1897], 24-25, fails of  course to convince Edgeworth,
who reiterates his accusations, with almost identical wording, in both
Edgeworth 1891, 370 and 1925, vol. ii, 311. In effect, Walras’s claims about
his theory of  the tâtonnement in exchange are wholly unfounded from a
methodological point of  view. First of  all, Walras’s theory of  the tâton-
nement in exchange is all but an objective description of  what really hap-
pens in a competitive market: contrary to what Walras himself  proba-
bly believes, and anyhow would have us to believe, his tâtonnement
construct is at least as theory-laden as any other alternative construct
aiming at explaining the working of  competitive markets.3 In the second
place, as to the alleged generality of  Walras’s tâtonnement, it is really hard
to decide whether Walras’s approach to disequilibrium analysis is more
or less general than, say, Edgeworth’s model of  recontracting (1881) or
Marshall’s model of  barter (1961 [1890], Appendix F. Barter, 791-793).
If  Walras’s theory of  the tâtonnement in exchange cannot plausibly be
said to provide the most general or realistic explanation of  competitive
disequilibrium processes, it can certainly be said to provide the most
natural explanation of  such processes that is consistent with the theo-
retical premises underlying Walras’s exchange model. It can even be ar-
gued that the ‘Walrasian rule of  price adjustment’, as well as the ensu-
ing tâtonnement process in exchange, represent the only possible
approach to disequilibrium analysis within Walras’s exchange model.
To avoid unnecessary complications, in the following discussion we
shall keep to the two-commodity model, as summarized above. As a
matter of  fact, the analysis of  the exchange problem can be generalized
1 Walras’s stance can be inferred, in particular, from his letters to Bortkiewicz and Pareto,
published in Jaffé 1965, vol. ii, 434, 630.
2 In striving to counteract Edgeworth assertion that Walras’s tâtonnement is just «a way, not
the way, of  descent to equilibrium», Bortkiewicz 1890, 358-359 writes:
Certes, il peut y avoir plus d’une méthode pour résoudre un systéme d’equations donné;
mais nous n’avons pas, dans le cas présent, un probléme d’algebre devant nous; il s’agit
plutôt de montrer quel est le procedée réel, effectivement employé sur le marché, qui
constitue le mode de résolution des équations données. Y aurait-il peut-être, d’après M.
Edgeworth, un autre phénomène économique se produisant sur le marché et pouvant
être regardé comme mode de résolution des équations en question? Non.
3 Sometimes even Walras seems to realize that a few peculiar traits of  the tâtonnement con-
struct are in fact dictated by the need to satify some compelling (for him) analytical require-
ments, rather than suggested by an open-minded observation of  the way in which the markets
of  the real world actually work. A few instances of  Walras’s oscillating attitude towards the
true epistemological status of  the tâtonnement construct will be given later in this Section, con-
cerning the exchange model with many (i.e., more than two) commodities, and in the next one,
concerning the production model.
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to models with any finite number (L > 2) of  commodities, and, indeed,
it has been so generalized by Walras himself  since the first edition of
the Eléments. Yet, such extensions of  the exchange model necessarily
raise some additional difficulties, which Walras is unable to solve in a
way that would fully meet contemporary standards of  rigor and gen-
erality. In fact, when the number of  traded commodities is L > 2, the
further difficulties to confront are twofold: in the first place, concern-
ing the so-called «solution théorique et mathématique», in Walras’s
sense, one has to specify what exactly are the prices to be taken as giv-
en parameters by the traders; secondly, concerning the so-called «solu-
tion pratique» or «empirique», still in Walras’s sense, one has to specify
how exactly the ‘Walrasian rule of  price adjustment’ works in a multi-
commodity exchange economy.
As to the first problem, Walras finds it convenient to suggest a two-
step solution procedure, which is clearly enunciated since the second
edition of  the Eléments. First he supposes that only direct trades be-
tween pairs of  commodities are allowed to take place on the ⎯L (L2– 1)
 separate ‘trading posts’, or «marchés spéciaux» (Walras 1988, 163, 2-5),
corresponding to all possible commodity pairs; such trades are as-
sumed to lead to the establishment of ⎯L (L2– 1) independent rates of ex-
change between pairs of commodities. According to Walras, however,
such rates can only correspond to a constrained or ‘imperfect’ equi-
librium, which would be disrupted if the pairwise trade constraint
were to be relaxed. Assuming then all kinds of indirect exchanges to
be allowed to take place, ‘arbitrage’ activities would lead the economy
to a ‘perfect or general’ equilibrium, whose distinctive feature would
be that the ⎯L (L2– 1) independent rates of exchange between pairs of com-
modities characteristic of the interim ‘imperfect’ equilibrium would
shrink to only L – 1 independent rates of  exchange between L – 1 com-
modities, arbitrarily chosen among the L commodities existing in the
economy, and the  remaining one, taken as a numéraire (Walras 1988,
161-173, 2-5). If, e.g., the first commodity were selected as the numéraire,
the price system  resulting from ‘arbitrage’ activities might be written
as p = (1, p2, …, pl, …, pL) ∈ {1} ×  L+–1 where pl is the price of  com-
modity l in terms of  commodity 1, for l = 2, …, L.
Now, the solution procedure suggested by Walras to tackle the first
problem is not entirely satisfactory, for the following two reasons: in the
first place, the interim ‘imperfect’ equilibrium, assumed to be reached in
the first step of  the procedure, can only make sense under Walras’s spe-
cial assumptions about the traders’ utility functions, which, as already
mentioned, are supposed to be additively separable in their arguments;
secondly, contrary to what Walras occasionally, but not invariably,
seems to suggest, one should refrain from confusing the issue of  the es-
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tablishment of  a ‘general’ equilibrium of  the L-commodity exchange
economy, in the sense of  the occurrence of  a simultaneous clearing of
all the L commodity markets, with the issue of  the formation of  a con-
sistent price system, as represented, e.g., by a vector of  L – 1 prices for as
many commodities, each price being expressed in terms of  the remain-
ing commodity chosen as a numéraire: in fact, a consistent price system,
in the sense specified, is perfectly compatible with market disequilibri-
um. Yet, in spite of  these shortcomings, Walras’s solution of  the first ad-
ditional problem arising in modeling a multi-commodity exchange
economy is not far from that adopted in the subsequent developments
of  general equilibrium theory.
Much more idiosyncratic and controversial, instead, is the approach
taken by Walras in confronting the second additional problem arising in
a multi-commodity exchange model. In such a context, the most natu-
ral way to generalize the ‘Walrasian rule of  price adjustment’ would ap-
pear to be the following: at any given moment of  time, given a price sys-
tem expressed in terms of  a numéraire, barring the price of  the numéraire
commodity, which is identically set equal to one, one should suppose
the prices of  all the other commodities whose aggregate excess de-
mands are different from zero to simultaneously move in the directions
prescribed by the ‘Walrasian rule’. In view of  the postulated simultane-
ity of  all price changes, this sort of  price adjustment process has been
labelled as the «simultaneous tâtonnement process» by Uzawa (1960, 184-
185), who has also proved its global stability under relatively restrictive
conditions, which are however not unusual in the modern analysis of
general equilibrium stability. Yet, though explicitly recognizing that the
«simultaneous tâtonnement process» is the natural candidate for ‘realis-
tically’ representing the real-word functioning of  a set of  interrelated
markets, hence for extending the ‘Walrasian rule of  price adjustment’
to a multi-commodity exchange model, in the more formalized part of
his discussion of  the equilibration process Walras (1988, 188-197, 1 and 2-
5) eventually opts for an alternative market-by-market procedure,
which «consists of  a price adjustment which successively clears the mar-
kets of  commodities». In view of  the postulated sequentiality of  the
price changes, which are assumed to occur one at a time in a definite or-
der, this sort of  price adjustment process has been labelled as the «suc-
cessive tâtonnement process» by Uzawa (1960, 186-188),1 who has also
proved its global stability under conditions similar to the ones invoked
in proving the stability of  the «simultaneous process». In referring to the
1 As we shall see in a moment, the labels «simultaneous» and «successive», suggested by
 Uzawa to describe the two alternative tâtonnement processes which are discussed, either infor-
mally or formally, in Walras’s Eléments, can actually be traced back to Walras himself, though
not specifically to the Eléments.
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system of  difference equations formalizing such «successive tâton-
nement process», Uzawa (1960, 186, fn. 1) further reminds the reader that
such «system defines an iterative method for solving systems of  equa-
tions which is known as the Gauss-Seidel method in numerical analysis»
(on this issue, see also Arrow and Hahn 1971, 305-306).
The reason why Walras, though regarding the «simultaneous tâton-
nement process» as a more faithful representation of  the true working
of  real competitive markets, ends up by selecting the alternative «suc-
cessive tâtonnement process» for the purposes of  his formal analysis, is
synthetically hinted at by Walras himself  in a letter to the Italian econ-
omist Maffeo Pantaleoni, dated «2 septembre 1889» and published in
 Jaffé 1965, vol. ii, 343-347. There, in referring to his market-by-market
 iterative tâtonnement process, Walras writes:
Reprenez encore les tâtonnements que je vous présente ainsi successivement pour les
besoins de l’analyse comme s’operant simultanément sur le marché, n’avez-vous pas
exactement dans son ensemble le fait de la determination des prix de plusieurs mar-
chandises sous l’émpire de la libre concurrence?
( Jaffé 1965, vol. ii, 345; italics in the original)
From this passage one can infer that it is only for allegedly analytical rea-
sons («pour les besoins de l’analyse») that Walras reluctantly opts for the
admittedly unrealistic «successive tâtonnement process». The fact is that
Walras, being wholly unaware of  the very existence of  such branches
of  mathematics as vector analysis and multivariate calculus, is unwill-
ingly forced to drop the «simultaneous tâtonnement process», whose
very description would require the use of  such tools, contenting him-
self with the «successive tâtonnement process» which, owing to its pecu-
liar market-by-market nature, can at least be described (though cer-
tainly not solved) by means of  scalar methods. Thus, in order to explain
Walras’s expository choice no more profound reason needs to be in-
voked than his poor mastership of  mathematics.1 Yet, chiefly because
of  the unfortunate coincidence of  Walras’s «successive tâtonnement
process» with the so-called Gauss-Seidel iterative method of  solving a
system of  simultaneous equations, a whole line of  literature has devel-
oped where the simple product of  Walras’s poor mathematical skills
has been occasionally mistaken for the result of  deep reflections con-
cerning the relationship between Walras’s two ‘solution’ concepts, the
1 It is certainly not accidental that, more than half  a century later, when the analysis of
tâtonnement stability is taken up again from a much higher mathematical standpoint, it will be
the «simultaneous process», rather than the «successive one», to attract the attention of   general
equilibrium theorists and to become the basis for the modern analysis of  general equilibrium
stability: see, in particular, Samuelson 1941 and 1942, for local stability; Arrow and Hurwicz
1958, Arrow, Block, and Hurwicz 1959, and Uzawa 1961 for global stability; Negishi 1962,
and Arrow and Hahn 1971, 263-323 for surveys of  results on tâtonnement stability.
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nature of  statics and dynamics, as well as the role of  time in the theory
of  the tâtonnement.1 Precisely for these reasons, however, in examining
the general epistemological properties of  the process engendered by
the application to the exchange model of  the ‘Walrasian rule of  price
adjustment’, it is wiser to stick to the two-commodity exchange model,
which, for its very nature, is free of  all the idiosyncratic aspects encum-
bering the multi-commodity one; on the other hand, the two-com-
modity exchange model is general enough for discussing all the funda-
mental issues we are interested in at this stage.
As we have seen above, in the model under question the traders are
assumed to be price-takers and utility-maximizers. This means that the
relative price is the only information signal commonly known to all the
traders and taken into account by all of  them in making their choices;
hence, the relative price is the only possible candidate to play the role
of  a state variable in the adjustment process towards equilibrium. Fur-
ther, for any given relative price, each trader’s optimal choice of  a plan
of  action, that is, a consumption or trade plan, turns out to be well de-
fined, both at equilibrium and out of  equilibrium, in accordance with
one and the same choice procedure, which is independent of  the state
of  the economy. It is precisely this property of  the Walrasian choice pro-
cedure which allows the theorist to construct the individual demand
and excess demand functions, from which, by aggregation over the
traders, the aggregate demand and excess demand functions can be de-
rived. Finally, from the latter the theorist can obtain, for any quoted
price, a measure of  market disequilibrium (as represented, e.g., by the
value of  the aggregate excess demand for either commodity at that
price), which in turn primes the appropriate feedback reaction, implic-
it in the ‘Walrasian rule of  price adjustment’.
In the above argument a crucial role is played by the fact that the Wal-
rasian choice procedure is the same whether the economy finds itself  at
an equilibrium or a disequilibrium state. This means that, in Walras’s
exchange model, equilibrium and disequilibrium are symmetrical
states, as far as the optimal choices of  plans of  action are concerned. But
they are not symmetrical states, as far as actual behavior is concerned.
As a matter of  fact, in Walras’s exchange model, an equilibrium is so de-
fined that the plans of  action optimally chosen by all the traders, being
mutually compatible, can be actually carried out (the mutual compati-
bility of  the chosen plans is supposedly granted by the market-clearing
condition, which evidently encompasses, albeit implicitly, some sort of
orderly market assumption). At an equilibrium state, therefore, the op-
timally chosen plans of  action, as such unobservable entities, give rise
1 See, in particular: Goodwin 1951 and 1953, Jaffé 1981, and Walker 1988.
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to the corresponding actions, which are instead observable. On the con-
trary, at a disequilibrium state, the optimally chosen plans of  action,
which still are unobservable entities, cannot give rise to the correspon-
ding actions: in fact, since the optimally chosen plans are not mutually
compatible, not all of  them can be carried out, so that the traders’ ac-
tual behavior cannot fully correspond to the planned one. From this a
fundamental conclusion can be drawn: even if  the Walrasian choice
procedure allows one to explain or predict the traders’ optimally cho-
sen plans of  action, as such unobservable, both at equilibrium and dis-
equilibrium states, Walras’s theory allows one to explain or predict the
traders’ optimal actions, that is, their observable behavior, at equilibri-
um only. This means, however, that observable disequilibrium behav-
ior, granting that it can actually occur in the economy, cannot be ex-
plained or predicted by the Walrasian theory of  the tâtonnement in
exchange: from the point of  view of  such theory, that sort of  behavior
is unpredictable.
But, even if  Walras’s theory of  the tâtonnement in exchange cannot
predict any observable disequilibrium behavior, can it at least allow for
the occurrence of  any such behavior? This question naturally raises an-
other: What would be the effect of  that sort of  behavior on the data of
the economy, specifically on the traders’ endowments?
Now, the economic data can change for both exogenous and en-
dogenous reasons. Disequilibrium behavior, which in this case basical-
ly means disequilibrium trading, or trading «at ‘false’ prices», to use
Hicks’s expression (1939, 128), would indeed affect the traders’ endow-
ments, even if, as we have just seen, Walras’s theory of  the tâtonnement
in exchange would be unable to predict the ensuing changes. Yet, as we
have seen in section 2 above, the data of  the economy must not be per-
mitted to change during the tâtonnement process, since otherwise the
«solution pratique» could no longer coincide with the «solution
théorique». From this it follows that the theory of  the tâtonnement in ex-
change should not allow for the occurrence of  any observable disequi-
librium behavior.
As to Walras, he is perfectly aware that the data of  the problem must
not change during the tâtonnement, for he writes:
C’est le droit du théoricien du supposer les éléments des prix invariables durant le
temps qu’il emploie à formuler la loi d’établissement des prix d’équilibre.
(Walras 1988, 146)
However, though reserving this right to himself, he seems to be in
doubt about how to exercise it. In fact, just at the beginning of  his treat-
ment of  the theory of  exchange, Walras (1988, 71-72) exemplifies the
working of  competition by considering a well-organized competitive
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market, the Paris Stock Exchange, where a specific state bond, the
«rente française 3%», is traded.1 Walras discusses three alternative hy-
potheses, exhausting all the possibilities, as to the state of  the market at
a given money price of  the bond under question: either equality be-
tween demand and supply, or excess demand, or excess supply. In ac-
cordance with the ‘Walrasian rule of  price adjustment’, the price re-
mains unchanged in the first case, while it rises in the second and falls
in the third. But Walras does not seem to suppose that trades can take
place only in the first case, that is, when the market is in equilibrium; on
the contrary, his treatment of  the three cases is entirely symmetrical.2
In 1883 Bertrand reviews Walras’s recently published Théorie mathé-
matique de la richesse sociale, which, as mentioned above, contains an
 example almost identical to the one just commented upon. Bertrand
reads Walras’s statements as implying that trades can actually take place
not only at equilibrium, but also out of  equilibrium. From this he infers
that, by repeatedly changing the data of  the problem, such trading at
disequilibrium prices will prevent the process from converging to the
«solution théorique et mathématique» of  the system of  equations
 representing the model, since those equations are based on the original
data. Hence, according to Bertrand, the problem of  exchange is inde-
terminate.
Walras reacts to this criticism in a paper published in 1885, where he
asserts that, from a theoretical point of  view, in an ideal market («sur le
marché théorique»), all exchanges are suspended as long as the market
is out of  equilibrium.3 Further, in the second edition of  the Eléments, he
modifies the passage discussed above in three different places, to the ef-
fect that trade is now suspended when there is either excess demand or
excess supply in the market, while it is assumed to take place when the
market is in equilibrium. Precisely, while leaving the remainder of  the
paragraph wholly unaltered, in the case of  excess demand Walras adds
just six words: «Théoriquement, l’échange doit être suspendu»; in the
case of  excess supply he inserts four words: «Suspension de l’échange»;
finally, in the case of  market clearing or market equilibrium, he adds the
lapidary sentence: «L’échange a lieu» (Walras 1988, 71-72, 2-5).
1 It should be noted that a quite similar example, though concerning a corn market, rather
than an asset market, can be found at the beginning of  Walras’s 1874 mémoire (Walras 1874, 32),
later reprinted without changes in both Walras 1877b and 1883.
2 In an applied paper on the working of  the Stock Exchange written a few years later, Wal-
ras points out that the practice prevailing at the Paris Stock Exchange at that time is that no
trade should take place out of  equilibrium (Walras 1880, 408, 432). This fact, however, is
nowhere commented upon in Walras’s previous or contemporary theoretical writings.
3 See Walras 1985, 312, fn. 1. A similar statement can also be found in a mémoire attached to
a letter sent by Walras to Pareto in 1895 (Jaffé 1965, vol. ii, 630); a draft of  the mémoire, how-
ever, had probably been written a few years before.
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In the second edition of  the Eléments, therefore, the explicit assump-
tion of  ‘no trade out of  equilibrium’ allows Walras to solve some of  the
problems, though not all the problems, that had marred the theory of
the tâtonnement in exchange in the first edition: the assumption of  in-
variance of  the economic data during the adjustment process is now
made rigorous; further, it is now made clear that the only kind of  dise-
quilibrium that is consistent with the ‘Walrasian rule of  price adjust-
ment’ and the associated theory of  the tâtonnement in exchange is un-
observable: we can still have disequilibrium plans of  action, but we can
no longer have disequilibrium actions or observable behavior. The ex-
plicit exclusion of  all observable disequilibrium behavior, due to the ‘no
trade out of  equilibrium’ assumption, might appear to entail a signifi-
cant loss in terms of  predictive power. But this fear is deceptive: for, as
explained above, no observable disequilibrium behavior could be pre-
dicted anyway.
With the ‘no trade out of  equilibrium’ assumption, the time structure
of  the analysis becomes clearer than before. From a temporal point of
view, the ‘market’ (that is, the exchange economy) under question be-
comes something self-contained, lacking any necessary connection
with either the preceding or the following ‘markets’ (if  any); as Walras
(1988, 77) says, when the market ends, the traders «s’en vont chacun de
leur coté». The data are unchanging from the beginning to the end of
the ‘market’, that is, until an equilibrium is established; but subse-
quently they typically change, since «les éléments des prix sont essen-
tiellement variables» (Walras 1988, 146). During the tâtonnement process
nothing observable can happen, since trades are ruled out and all other
possible sources of  changes in the data are equally excluded: this means,
however, that the time over which the tâtonnement evolves is essentially
a ‘logical’ time, not a ‘real’ one, and that the tâtonnement, being a pure-
ly virtual process, requires only one instant of  ‘real’ time to carry its ef-
fects through. Moreover, when an equilibrium is reached, all the
planned trades take place at the same instant, at the equilibrium price.
As Walras himself  writes:
Le prix courant théorique est essentiellement un prix unique résultant, à un moment
donné, d’un échange général.
(Walras 1885, 312, fn. 1; italics added)
To sum up, the sort of  exchange equilibrium which emerges from the
‘no trade out of  equilibrium’ assumption appears to be so strictly relat-
ed to one specific instant of  ‘real’ time, namely, the instant to which the
data defining the equilibrium can be referred, as to deserve the name of
‘instantaneous’ equilibrium. The expression ‘instantaneous equilibri-
um’ is never used by Walras, even if, as we have just seen, Walras ex-
Equilibrium and tâtonnement in Walras’s Eléments 109
plicitly connects the equilibrium prices and trades to ‘a given instant’
(«un moment donné») in the history of  the economy. Similarly, the dis-
tinction between a ‘logical’ and a ‘real’ time is never explicitly drawn by
Walras in discussing the exchange model in either the second edition of
the Eléments or his other writings dating back to the same period.1 Yet,
in spite of  this omission, that expression and that distinction are useful,
and even necessary, to correctly reconstruct Walras’s system of
thought, as it emerges from the introduction of  the ‘no trade out of
equilibrium’ assumption in the exchange model of  the second edition
of  the Eléments.
In this respect, it should also be noted that in the same second edition
Walras keeps unaltered the expressions «état stationnaire» and «prix sta-
tionnaire», already employed in the first edition to qualify respectively
the ‘market equilibrium state’ and the sort of  price which should be ex-
pected to rule in such an equilibrium state (Walras 1988, 71-72, 93; 196, 1;
197, 2-5). But such state and price are «stationnaire» only in the ‘logical’
time over which the tâtonnement takes place. The use of  these expres-
sions in no way implies that the data of  the economy should be taken
to be stationary in the ‘real’ time over which the economy evolves. In
fact, immediately after the passage quoted above, claiming the theo-
rist’s right to assume the data unchanging during the tâtonnement
process, Walras (1988, 146) goes on by saying:
Mais c’est son devoir, une fois cette opération terminée, de se souvenir que les
 éléments des prix sont essentiellement variables et de formuler en conséquence la loi
de variation des prix d’équilibre.
4. Equilibrium and tâtonnement in the first two editions
of the Eléments: production
Let us consider now the production model. In this model the quantities
of  the consumers’ goods available in the economy are no longer viewed
as given amounts, as they were in the exchange model of  the previous
section, where they were taken to coincide with the given endowments
ˆcli, for l = 1, …, L and i = 1, …, I; rather, they are regarded as the vari-
able outcome of  an endogenous process, the production process, trans-
forming productive services (inputs) into consumers’ goods (outputs).
The services issue from various types of  factors or ‘capitals’ («capi-
taux», in Walras’s terminology), grouped into the three categories of
lands, persons, and capital goods proper. A service simply consists in the
use of  a certain quantity of  capital for a specified period of  time. Wal-
1 As we shall see in section 6 below, however, in the fourth edition of  the Eléments Walras,
though using a different terminology, will explicitly draw a similar distinction, concerning the
use of  the time concept in all his equilibrium models, including the pure-exchange one.
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ras’s choice of  units is such that the quantity of  a service turns out to
be numerically equal to the quantity of  capital from which the service
flows. In the production model the quantities of  the various types of
capitals are part of  the data of  the problem. Hence, the quantities of  the
services available in the economy are regarded as given amounts,  taking
the place of  the endowments of  consumers’ goods of  the exchange
model.
The owners of  the various types of  capitals coincide with the con-
sumers. The latter can still be identified with the traders of  the ex-
change model; however, since in the production model there also exists
another category of  agents, the entrepreneurs or producers, who are al-
so involved in the trading activity, in this context we prefer to avoid the
term ‘traders’ altogether, using instead the expression ‘consumers’ or
‘owners’, to designate one category of  agents, and ‘entrepreneurs’ or
‘producers’, to designate the other. In the production model the own-
ers of  the various types of  capitals are not allowed to sell them; yet they
can lease them, that is, they can sell their services. The services can be
sold either to the entrepreneurs as productive services or to other con-
sumers as consumers’ services; otherwise the owners can make a direct
use of  the services of  the capitals they own as consumers’ services.
As far as consumers are concerned, Walras keeps to the assumption
of  ‘competitive behavior’, duly extended to the new context. Con-
sumers are still indexed by i = 1, …, I, and consumers’ goods by l = 1,
…, L. Further, let us suppose that there are M distinct services in the
economy, indexed by m = 1, …, M, where 0 < M < .
Consumer i’s consumption set is given by Xi × Yi = {(xi, yi)} =  L++M,
where (xi, yi) is a consumption plan of  consumer i, xi = (x1i, …, xLi) ∈ L+
consumer i’s demand for the L consumers’ goods, and yi = (y1i, …, yMi)
∈M+ consumer i’s demand for the M services. Let ui :  L++M→ be con-
sumer i’s utility function. Finally, let ˆsi = (ˆs1i, …, ˆsMi) ∈M+ be owner
i’s endowment of  the M services. Consumer i’s characteristics are then
represented by the triple (Xi × Yi, ui (·), ˆ si). Let p = (1, …, pL) ∈{1} ×  L+–1
be the prices of  consumers’ goods, expressed in terms of  commodity 1,
an always desired consumers’ good, taken as the numéraire; let w =
(w1, …, wM) ∈M+ be the prices of  the M services, expressed in terms of
the same numéraire. The price system is then (p, w) ∈ {1} ×  L+–1+M.
Given a price system (p, w) ∈{1} ×  L+–1+M, consumer i solves the fol-
lowing optimization problem:
max ui (xi, yi)
(xi, yi) ∈ Xi × Yi
s.t. (4.1)
pxi + wyi = wˆsi or pxi = w (ˆsi – yi)
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Let us assume, for simplicity, that consumer i’s characteristics are
so specified that, ∀ (p, w) ∈ {1} ×  L+–1+M, the optimization problem
has a unique solution, (xi, yi) (p, w) ∈  L+ × M+. The function (xi, yi) :
{1} ×  L+–1+M →  L+ × M+ is consumer i’s demand function, where the
first component function, xi (·), refers to the demand for consumers’
goods, while the second component function, yi (·), refers to the demand
for consumers’ services. Let ˆs ≡ ™ ii=1 ˆsi be the aggregate endowments
(of  services) of  the economy; further, let x (·) ≡ ™ ii=1 xi (·) and y (·) ≡
™ ii=1 yi (·) be the aggregate demand function for consumers’ goods and
the aggregate demand function for consumers’ services, respectively.
As we have already remarked in discussing the exchange model,
 consumers’ optimal choices of  consumption plans are well defined
when both equilibrium and disequilibrium prices are quoted; further,
consumers’ optimal choices are arrived at by following one and the same
procedure in either case. It should also be noted that profits (or losses)
do not appear in consumers’ budget constraints. Those profits (or loss-
es) that should accrue during the production process are not credited (or
debited) to consumers, but are retained (or made good) by producers.
Each entrepreneur produces one output only, employing a constant
quantity of  each input per unit of  output, whatever the scale of
 production. While the single-output assumption is never called into
question by Walras, the fixed-coefficients assumption, instead, is
 occasionally questioned by him. An alternative hypothesis of  variable
coefficients, resulting from the choice of  the cost-minimizing produc-
tion technique, is adumbrated in the first edition of  the Eléments
 (Walras 1988, 305), and exposed in a quite rudimentary and confused
way since the third (1988, 720-2, 3; 586-591, 4, 4-5, or 5). Anyhow, since
the alternative hypothesis is nowhere employed in the analytical part
of  the  Eléments, we shall keep to the fixed-coefficients assumption in
the  following.
Let A = [aml] = [a1, …, al, …, aL] be the M × L matrix of  the technical
coefficients of  the economy, where aml is the quantity of  input m need-
ed to produce one unit of  output l, while al is the M-dimensional vector
whose elements represent the quantities of  the M inputs needed to pro-
duce one unit of  output l.
Given (p, w), the unit profit vector is  = (1, …, l, …, L) = p – wA.
Under the stipulated conditions, the assumption that each producer of
consumers’ good l will choose the quantity of  output to produce, say
q*l , and correspondingly the quantities of  inputs to employ, alq*l, in such
a way as to maximize profits, does not generally give rise to well defined
choices. For, if  l > 0, then there exists no profit-maximizing choice;
if l = 0, then the profit-maximizing choice is indeterminate, that is,
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q*l ∈ [0, ); finally, if  l < 0, then q*l = 0 (hence, the last is the only case
where the choice is well defined).
In all probability, this is the main reason why Walras does not assume
the producers to be profit maximizers.1 This theoretical choice is full of
consequences, for it entails an asymmetrical treatment, within the same
model, of  the behavior of  consumers and producers, both at and out of
equilibrium. Since producers are not supposed ‘to behave competitive-
ly’, namely, to act as price-taking profit maximizers, the ‘Walrasian rule
of  price adjustment’ cannot be generalized to the whole economy, that
is, to the totality of  the agents; on the other hand, Walras cannot either
give up completely his ‘price adjustment rule’, as in the economy there
still exists a category of  agents, namely, the consumers, who ‘behave
competitively’, and consequently depend on that ‘rule’ for adjusting
their choices. The solution devised by Walras consists in duplicating the
rules, that is, in placing a new rule, that might be called the ‘Walrasian
rule of  quantity adjustment’, to the side of  the already existing one, the
‘Walrasian rule of  price adjustment’: in the production model, there-
fore, the revisions of  the choices of  plans of  action (consumption plans),
made by consumers during their own specific tâtonnement process, con-
tinue to depend on the ‘price adjustment rule’, exactly as they did before
in the exchange model; on the contrary, the revisions of  the aggregate
behavior of  producers during their own specific tâtonnement process are
made to depend on the newly devised ‘quantity adjustment rule’.
The ‘quantity adjustment rule’ works in a way that is quite different
from that of  the ‘price adjustment rule’. In the case of  production, in
fact, given the single-output assumption, Walras takes into considera-
tion the whole set of  producers supplying a certain output, that is, in
Marshallian language, the ‘industry’ producing it. For each consumers’
good l to be produced, he supposes the quantity to be supplied by the
industry l to be randomly assigned («criée au hazard») at the start of  the
specific tâtonnement process concerning production, and subsequently
increased or decreased, over a time set to be suitably specified, accord-
ing to whether the unit profit l is greater or less than zero; over the
time set of  the tâtonnement in production, the output of  good l will not
change if  and only if  l is nil, this being the sign that an equilibrium out-
1 Many clues suggest that Walras would have adopted profit maximization as a possible ex-
planation of  producers’ choices, were it not for the nonexistence of  solutions to the maxi-
mization problem when unit profits are positive. In effect, when unit profits are negative, and
consequently the profit-maximizing solution exists and is perfectly determinate (q*l = 0), Wal-
ras is frequently led to adopt the profit-maximizing solution, implying the suspension of  pro-
duction (Walras 1988, 329, 399, 709, 4-5), even if, as we shall see in a moment, this breaks the
symmetry of  his own ‘quantity adjustment rule’, causing a discontinuity in producers’ behav-
ior that it is quite difficult to accept.
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put has been reached. For each consumers’ good l, therefore, the out-
put of  good l as a function of  time (in the appropriate time set) is the
state variable of  the dynamic system governing the production adjust-
ment process.
As can be seen, this tâtonnement is really something different from the
tâtonnement in exchange discussed in the previous section: first, atten-
tion is focussed on a collective entity, the industry, rather than on the in-
dividual producers composing it; second, as an almost unavoidable con-
sequence of  the previous modeling decision, little room is left to the
discussion of  individual choices (the only individual decision explicitly
mentioned by Walras being the decision to suspend production in the
case of  losses, on which we have dwelled in the previous footnote);
third, once again as an almost necessary consequence of  what has just
been said, the equilibrium concept is not immediately related to a state
where the plans of  action optimally chosen by the individual agents of
the economy are mutually compatible, hence executable. In a sense,
and contrary to what Walras himself  occasionally seems to suggest, the
‘quantity adjustment rule’ and the ensuing tâtonnement process in pro-
duction appear to be more directly inspired by the pre-existent classical
approach than the ‘price adjustment rule’ and the associated tâton-
nement process in exchange.
In any case, as far as the production model is concerned, the outcome
of  Walras’s modeling decisions, perfectly outlined since the first edition
of  the Eléments, is the following: within the same model there coexist
two distinct categories of  agents, consumers and producers, obeying
different sets of  choice or behavior assumptions, as well as two distinct
rules of  adjustment, the ‘price’ and the ‘quantity adjustment rule’, gov-
erning two different and separate tâtonnement processes, the tâton-
nement in exchange and the tâtonnement in production, respectively. Not
surprisingly, such coexistence of  alternative rules and assumptions
gives rise to a number of  serious problems, marring both equilibrium
and disequilibrium analysis. At the equilibrium, however, most prob-
lems turn out to be concealed, owing to the special features of  the equi-
librium concept adopted by Walras for this model.
In the production model, an equilibrium is defined as an array of
prices, (p*, w*) ∈{1} ×  L+–1+M, and quantities, (x*, y*) ∈ L+ × M+, satis-
fying the following two systems of  equations:1
1 Following Walras, we give here the equilibrium conditions in equational form. As the sub-
sequent debate has demonstrated, it would be easy, and theoretically more satisfactory, to
transform the equation systems (4.2) and (4.3) into systems of  inequalities, accompanied by the
appropriate complementary slackness conditions. However, since this change is irrelevant for
our present purposes, we prefer to keep to Walras’s original formulation.
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p* = w*A (4.2)
Ax* + y* = ˆs (4.3)
where x* = x (p*, w*) and y* = y (p*, w*).
When equations (4.2) and (4.3) above are satisfied, the state variables
of  the dynamical systems expressing the two ‘Walrasian adjustment
rules’, of  ‘prices’ and ‘quantities’, respectively, take on stationary values
in their respective time sets. As * = p* – w* A = 0, the problem of  the
allotment of  profits (losses) cannot arise, so that the consumers’ budg-
et constraints duly take into account all the incomes generated in the
economy. On the other hand, the fact that the equilibrium demand for
consumers’ goods, x*, equals the equilibrium supply of  such goods,
what in turn implies that the equilibrium demand for capital services,
Ax*, equals the equilibrium supply of  such services coming from the
owners of  the various types of  capitals, ˆs – y*, may be interpreted, if
one so wishes, as the outcome of  optimizing choices made not only
by consumers, as one would expect a priori, but also by producers:
for, if * = 0, then the equilibrium aggregate input-output vector
(Ax*, x*) may indeed be viewed as the aggregate outcome of  profit-
 maximizing choices made by individual producers, each producing an
otherwise indeterminate proper fraction of  such equilibrium aggregate
input-output vector. Hence, after all, the differences in the behavioral
rules governing the choices of  the two groups of  agents in the econo-
my are somewhat disguised at the equilibrium.
Yet, what may be concealed at the equilibrium, cannot be hidden out
of  equilibrium. Due to this, in developing his theory of  the tâtonnement
with specific reference to the production model, Walras gets entangled
in a number of  inaccuracies, mistakes, and self-contradictory state-
ments, which he tries to correct by repeatedly changing his exposition.
In fact, this is the only part of  Walras’s overall theory of  the tâtonnement
for which no less than four significantly different versions are put for-
ward in the Eléments and related writings: beyond the three alternative
versions to be found, as is usual concerning the theory of  the tâton-
nement, in the first, second, and fourth edition of  the Eléments, respec-
tively, in this case one can also find a fourth variant in the «Théorie
géométrique de la détermination des prix».
We shall now summarize that part of  Walras’s analysis of  the tâ-
tonnement process in the production model which is common to the
versions developed in the first two editions of  the Eléments and, with
one qualification, to the variant contained in the «Théorie géomé-
trique» as well. The differences between these versions will be exam-
ined later in this section, when we shall also critically discuss Walras’s
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approach. Until that moment, we shall deliberately abstain from any
critical remark.
The first point to be stressed is the following: since in the model un-
der discussion Walras makes use of  two distinct rules of  adjustment,
the ‘price’ and the ‘quantity adjustment rule’, to which two distinct
types of  tâtonnement are associated, the tâtonnement in exchange and the
tâtonnement in production, here the analysis of  the overall adjustment
process necessarily takes the form of  a sequence of  alternating partial
adjustment processes, each governed by its specific adjustment rule and
developing in its appropriate time set.1 How all such different time sets
should be interpreted, and what sort of  relation should be postulated
among them, is a problem that we shall discuss in due time.
Walras assumes that, at the beginning of  the overall tâtonnement
process, let us say at time 0, a vector w0 ∈M+ of  prices of  services and a
vector q0 ∈ L+ of  quantities of  consumers’ goods to be produced be ran-
domly announced; in order to supply the output vector q0 the producers
need to employ an input vector Aq0. The produced quantities of con-
sumers’ goods are sold at prices that clear the corresponding markets,
that is, assuming of course a solution to exist, the quantities q0 are sold
at selling prices («prix de vente») pˆ0 ∈{1} ×  L+–1 such that x (pˆ0, w0) = q0.2
At input prices w0, the vector of the unit costs of consumers’ goods,
called by Walras «prix de revient», is c0 = w0A. In general it will turn out
that c0  p0. For each good l such that, cl0  pl0, the ‘Walrasian rule of
quantity adjustment’ calls for an increase or a decrease of the quantity
produced with respect to ql0, over the appropriate time set, according to
whether pl0 is greater or less than cl0, or, what is the same, according to
1 Once again, referring to this sequence of  alternating partial adjustment processes, Walras
seems to recognize that this peculiar feature of  his theory of  the tâtonnement is due to «les bé-
soins de la démonstration», rather than to descriptive realism. In fact, according to Walras
1988, 704, 3-5, in order to get «une image exacte et complète du phénomène général de l’étab-
lissement de l’équilibre économique sous l’empire de la libre concurrence», it is necessary that
«on se représente comme s’effectuant simultanément toutes les opérations que, pour les bé-
soins de la démonstration, nous avons dû supposer s’effectuant successivement».
2 This is the assumption made in the first two editions of  the Eléments. In the «Théorie
géométrique», instead, Walras 1988, 700-702, 3-5 assumes that, at time 0, beyond w0 and q0, al-
so a vector of prices of consumers’ goods, p0, be randomly announced. Such a vector is then
supposed to converge to pˆ0 through a tâtonnement process, based on the ‘price adjustment rule’
and quite similar in principle to the tâtonnement of  the exchange model. What Walras is trying
to do here is clear: he is striving to incorporate the tâtonnement in exchange into the overall tâ-
tonnement of  the production model. To this end, he constructs an artificial exchange model, by
supposing that q0, the quantities of consumers’ goods to be produced, randomly announced at
time 0 in the production model, can play the role of ˆc, the given aggregate endowments of
consumers’ goods in the exchange model discussed in section 3 above. His analysis is flawed,
however, and he gets nowhere. In particular, he forgets that in whatever exchange model, even
an artificial one, it is not enough to specify the aggregate endowments of  the economy to make
the model solvable: for one has also to know, among other things, the distribution of  such en-
dowments among the traders.
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whether l0 = pl0 – cl0 is greater or less than 0. According to Walras, the
change in the output of good l will induce a change in the opposite di-
rection in the corresponding price, via the market-clearing mechanism
discussed in the previous paragraph, while the unit cost of  the same
good will remain unaltered so long as the prices of  the inputs are fixed
at their initial values w0; therefore the divergence between price and
unit cost will tend to be reduced. According to Walras the quantity ad-
justment process will go on until the quantities produced of the various
goods converge to a vector qˆ1 with the following properties: when the
quantities produced are qˆ1, the corresponding selling prices, that is, the
market-clearing prices pˆ1 such that x (pˆ1, w0) = qˆ1, are also equal to the
unit costs, so that one has pˆ1 = w0A as well.
This point being reached, however, one can only be sure that
w0Aqˆ1, the value of the services bought by the producers, is equal
to w0 [ˆs – y (pˆ1, w0)], the value of the services that their respective
 owners wish to sell to the producers.1 But, in general, one will have
Aqˆ1  ˆs – y (pˆ1, w0), that is, the quantities of the services bought by
the producers will generally be different from the quantities of  the
services that their respective owners wish to sell to the producers.
Therefore, in order to bring to equality demand for and supply of
services, one further tâtonnement turns out to be necessary in the
market for services: this time the rule to apply is the ‘Walrasian rule
of  price adjustment’, according to which the price of  a service in-
creases or decreases according to whether the excess demand for that
service is greater or less than zero. The working of  the mechanism
is rather obscure in this case, since changes in the prices of  the serv-
ices can only exert their effects on the demands for services coming
from the consumers; but all the same Walras proves confident that
the process will converge to a market-clearing vector of  prices of  the
services, say to a vector wˆ1 such that Aqˆ1 = ˆs – y (pˆ1, wˆ1).
Now, when the quantities produced are qˆ1 and the service prices wˆ1,
the prices pˆ1, which cleared the markets for consumers’ goods at the ini-
tial quantities q0 and service prices w0, no longer clear their respective
markets. Hence the overall tâtonnement will have to start again from the
same point from which it had initially started. According to Walras,
however, the extent of  the disequilibrium existing in the economy will
diminish at every round of  the overall tâtonnement, so that in the end the
1 This equality can be proved by first summing over the consumers the budget constraint
equations appearing in the maximization problems (4.1), getting ™ ii=1 pˆ1 xi (pˆ1, w0) =
™ii=1 w0 [ˆsi – yi (pˆ1, w0)], hence pˆ1 x (pˆ1, w0) = w0 [ˆs – y (pˆ1, w0)]. Then, by recalling that
x (pˆ1, w0) = qˆ1 and pˆ1 = w0A, a simple substitution into the previous equation gives the desired
result. It should be noted that, before reaching this stage of  the overall tâtonnement, not even
this  result can be granted.
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process will ‘certainly’ (or at least ‘probably’) converge to a full price
and quantity equilibrium of  the production model.
Walras’s ‘proof ’ of  the convergence to an equilibrium of  the tâton-
nement process in the production model is no more convincing than
the similar ‘proofs’ that he provides with regard to all his other mod-
els. But it is not to this deficiency of  Walras’s theory, already men-
tioned in section 2, that we want to draw the readers’ attention now.
Rather we want to stress that the tâtonnement process in the produc-
tion model, as imagined by Walras and summarized above, is logical-
ly faulty and cannot work, even in principle, since it stumbles from
the very beginning against an insuperable obstacle, namely, the unen-
forceability of  undesired actions in an economy based on voluntary
exchange.
In fact suppose, as no doubt Walras does in the first two editions of
the Eléments, that the announced output q0 be actually produced and
sold at market-clearing prices pˆ0. As already mentioned, the input
 quantities required to produce q0 are Aq0. But who can be supposed to
sell such quantities? Certainly not the owners of the services, for, at
prices (pˆ0, w0), they wish to sell to the producers quantities of services
ˆs – y (pˆ0, w0), which typically differ from Aq0; so that the process
 envisaged by Walras cannot apparently even start. And of course, even
if the process could be started somehow, the same obstacle would pres-
ent itself over and over again, during the whole duration of the tâton-
nement, since the equality between demand for and supply of  services
would be reached only at the end of  the process, when the last tâtonne-
ment in the market for services were eventually to converge.
Walras proves to be partly aware of  the existence of  this problem, as
witnessed by the repeated attempts to contrive some solution he makes
in the various editions of  the Eléments and related writings. Anyhow,
even if  Walras’s proposed way-outs are far from satisfactory (at least be-
fore the final solution put forward in the 1900 edition of  the Eléments),
his understanding of  the special difficulties surrounding the theory of
tâtonnement in production is much clearer than that exhibited by most
of  the later critics and commentators of  that same theory.1
1 In particular, Walker 1972, 1987, and 1996 probably too busy at praising the realistic flavor
of  Walras’s theory of  tâtonnement in production in the first three editions of  the Eléments, as
contrasted with the despicable approach embraced by him in the fourth one, does not even
 realize the existence of  the very serious difficulty pointed out in the text, a difficulty which in
the last analysis explains both Walras’s twistings in the first three editions of  the Eléments and
his final change of  course in the fourth one. On the other hand, Huck 2001, and Bridel and
Huck 2002, engrossed by the idea that Walras’s problem in the first three editions of  the
Eléments is to neutralize the so-called ‘distributional effects of  disequilibrium production’, do
not apparently realize that Walras’s real problem in those editions is how to dodge the issue of
the unenforceability of  unintended actions in a disequilibrium economy resting on the volun-
tary exchange assumption.
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The first device concocted by Walras, in both the mémoire «Equations
de la production» (1876b) and the first edition of  the Eléments, consists in
assuming the existence of  ‘a foreign market’ («un marché étranger»),
where there are people willing to make available whatever amounts of
services were to be required by the domestic entrepreneurs (Walras 1988,
312, 1). Not only are these foreign people assumed to be ready to deliver
the required amounts of  services on demand, but they are also supposed
to be satisfied with being paid, in exchange for the quantities of  services
supplied, an aggregate value which is different from that realized by
 selling the goods produced with the employment of  those same servic-
es; further, according to Walras, this story must go on for as long as
 necessary, that is, until the equalities between prices and unit costs have
been brought about by the appropriate tâtonnement. In conclusion, there-
fore, the problem arising here is not only that of  specifying how profits
and losses should be allotted among consumers, a problem already
stressed by Morishima (1977, 49) with reference to Walras’s tâtonnement
in production; the real question here is that the transactions envisaged by
Walras are nothing but ‘swindles’,1 as they do not even respect the basic
condition of  voluntary exchange, namely, the quid pro quo clause.
The confused hypothesis that the producers shall buy the required
amounts of  services on ‘a foreign market’ is a device that badly conceals
the real problem. Probably Walras soon realizes that the suggested
 contrivance is not only inadequate, but also counterproductive, for it
contradicts the true spirit of  general competitive analysis. Yet, it is only
since the second edition of  the Eléments that he drops it, adopting in-
stead a significantly new set of  assumptions.
First of  all, an attempt is made to ground the tâtonnement in the pro-
duction model on the same basic foundations as the tâtonnement in the
exchange model:
Il s’agit d’arriver à l’équilibre de la production de la même façon que nous sommes
arrivés à l’équilibre de l’échange, c’est-à-dire en supposant les données du problème
invariables pendant tout le temps que dureront nos tâtonnements, sauf  à supposer
ensuite ces données variables en vue d’étudier les effets de leurs variations.
(Walras 1988, 308, 2-3)
Yet, the approach cannot be exactly the same in the two cases, since
there also exists an important difference between the tâtonnement in
production and that in exchange, which cannot be neglected:
Mais le tâtonnement en matière de production rencontre une complication qui
n’existait pas en matière d’échange. Dans l’échange, il n’y a pas de modification des
marchandises. Un prix étant crié, et la demande et l’offre effective correspondant à
1 Solow 1956, 554 is the first to use the word «swindle» with reference to Walras’s tâton-
nement, though in a sense different from the present one.
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ce prix n’étant pas égales, on crie un autre prix auquel correspondent une autre de-
mande et une autre offre effectives. Dans la production il y a transformation des ser-
vices producteurs en produits. Certain prix des services étant criés, et certain quan-
tités de produits étant fabriquées, si ces prix et ces quantités ne sont pas prix et
quantités d’équilibre, il faudra non seulement crier d’autres prix, mais fabriquer d’au-
tres quantités de produits.
(Walras 1988, 308, 2-5)
This passage, which will remain unaltered until the last edition of  the
Eléments, has been frequently misinterpreted, in particular by Patinkin
(1955, 378-380), as we shall see later in section 6. To fully understand its
meaning, one should recall that, already in the second edition of  the Elé-
ments, Walras definitely adopts the idea that, in the tâtonnement in ex-
change, no actual transaction can take place, nor any natural or eco-
nomic event can occur out of  equilibrium, which is capable of  altering
the data of  the problem: in fact, as Walras makes it clear in the above
passage, all that occurs in disequilibrium is that new prices are an-
nounced and new plans of  action (not actions) are correspondingly for-
mulated. But when it comes to production the situation is wholly dif-
ferent: in this case, according to Walras, during the tâtonnement real
actions are carried out and physical transformations take place which
give rise to observable outcomes. Of  such difference one has to take ac-
count, as the following passage witnesses:
Acceptant cette nécessité, nous devons supposer que, pour chaque reprise du tâton-
nement, nos entrepreneurs trouveront, dans le pays, des propriétaires fonciers, tra-
vailleurs et capitalistes possédant les mêmes quantités de services et ayant le mêmes
besoins des services et des produits.
(Walras 1988, 308, 2-3)
The new assumptions introduced by Walras aim at solving two prob-
lems at a time. In the first place, he wants to get rid of  the indefensible
deus ex machina of  the first edition (the ‘foreign market’): hence, he ac-
cepts to close his model, focussing attention on ‘the domestic economy’
(«le pays») only. In the second place, however, he has also to take care of
another requirement: even if  something real and observable is occur-
ring during the tâtonnement in production, the data of  the economy
must remain unchanged. To this purpose Walras assumes the economy
under consideration to be stationary, that is, to repeat itself  identically,
period after period, as far as its data are concerned. The requirement
that the data remain unchanged during the tâtonnement in production is
here satisfied by means of  the novel assumption that the data of  the
economy remain unchanged in the ‘real’ time set, that is, in that same
time set over which the economy evolves; this implies that a ‘period’ in
the history of  the economy coincides with a ‘round’ of  the tâtonnement
process under question.
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The assumption of  invariance of  the data of  the economy in the ‘re-
al’ time set or, in short, the assumption of  stationarity of  the economy,
is here legitimate, since the data are all exogenous variables, functions,
or relations, which cannot undergo any endogenous change as a result
of  what occurs in the economy, either at equilibrium or out of  equilib-
rium. On the one hand, utility functions and technology are exogenous
by assumption; therefore, if  one so wishes, they can legitimately be tak-
en as invariant in the ‘real’ time set. On the other hand, in the economy
envisaged in the production model, only two types of  commodities are
allowed to be the object of  economic activity: consumers’ goods and
services. Both types of  commodities have the nature of  flow variables
(or «revenus», as Walras calls them), which cannot be stored and do not
outlast their first use (Walras 1988, 280). An economy with these char-
acteristics may be conveniently called a ‘pure flow economy’. Hence,
no economic activity is capable of  endogenously affecting the data of  a
pure flow economy, by permanently changing the quantities of  un-
storable flow variables.
While the assumption of  stationarity of  the economy, in the sense
specified, solves the two problems mentioned above, such assumption
cannot of  course solve all the remaining problems of  the tâtonnement in
production. In particular, at each resumption («reprise») of  the tâton-
nement in production, the same difficulty immediately emerges in the
‘closed’ stationary pure flow economy of  the second edition, as it
emerged in the ‘open’ economy of  the first: who is going to take care
of  the mismatch between the required quantities of  inputs and the
quantities that the ‘domestic’ owners are willing to supply? In a sense,
the situation is even worse here, since, in the absence of  the accommo-
dating foreign market of  the first edition, there is no longer any exter-
nal agency on which to unload the burden of  the unavoidable ‘swin-
dles’. As a matter of  fact, one ought honestly to admit (but Walras
doesn’t) that, in this case, nobody can really predict what will actually
happen in the economy out of  equilibrium: so, even if  here some sort
of  observable disequilibrium behavior is allowed to take place in the ‘re-
al’ time over which the economy evolves, no theory is actually available
to predict such behavior. Yet this outcome is less disturbing than it
might appear at first sight: for, in a pure flow stationary economy, any
sort of  disequilibrium activity, whatever it might be, cannot leave any
mark on the data of  the economy; it can only affect, hopefully in the
right direction, the state variables of  the adjustment process. Such sort
of  observable disequilibrium behavior, which cannot possibly affect the
evolution of  the data of  the economy in the ‘real’ time set, may be con-
veniently called ‘inessential’; but, precisely because it is inessential, its
unpredictability is after all irrelevant.
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As far as the second edition of  the Eléments is concerned, our findings
up to this point can be summed up as follows: while in this edition the
tâtonnement in exchange appears to be a virtual process, in ‘logical’ time,
with unobservable disequilibrium, in the same edition the tâtonnement
in production appears as an actual process, in ‘real’ time, with observ-
able (though, rigorously, both inessential and unpredictable) disequili -
brium. These two interpretations of  the tâtonnement, though coexist-
ing, as we have just seen, in the same edition of  the Eléments, are
referred by Walras to two different activities, exchange and production,
or even, with one qualification, to two different models: the exchange
and the production model, respectively.1
Such two interpretations will be repeatedly taken up again in the lat-
er literature on the tâtonnement. Yet, they will be typically seen as alter-
native interpretations of  one and the same model. Thus Hicks (1934,
343), referring to Walras’s exchange model (freely interpreted), writes:
Walras’ system of  prices will be reached, either if  contracts are made provisionally
or (a more important case) if  people come on to the market on successive ‘days’ with
the same dispositions to trade, and there is no carry-over of  stocks (or a constant
 carry-over) from one day to the next.
Many years later Varian (1984, 247), referring to a general equilibrium
model which should probably be interpreted as an exchange model, but
might also be read as a suitably specified production model, will write:
The tâtonnement story makes sense in two sorts of  situations, one being the situation
where no trade takes place until equilibrium is reached, so that the adjustment
process is really just an ‘auctioneer’s rule’. The other situation is where all goods are
unstorable so that each day the market reopens with new goods and all agents start
their attempts to trade all over again.
What really matters, here, is to stress something that is not fully un-
derstood either by Walras, or, for that matter, by most of  his successors:
the two alternative interpretations of  the tâtonnement support two al-
ternative interpretations of  the equilibrium concept, which will be
called respectively the ‘instantaneous’ and the ‘stationary’ interpreta-
tion in the following. As we have seen at the end of  the previous sec-
tion, since the virtual tâtonnement in exchange does not entail the car-
rying out of  any action out of  equilibrium, it may be supposed to take
place in a ‘logical’ time which can be distinguished from the ‘real’ time
over which the economy evolves; hence, from a formal point of  view,
1 The qualification is due to this: while in the model of  exchange only one interpretation of
the tâtonnement (namely, the tâtonnement in exchange) is actually present, in the model of
 production both interpretations of  the tâtonnement (namely, both the tâtonnement in exchange
and the tâtonnement in production) are actually employed by Walras, even if, as we have seen
above, he does not succeed in satisfactorily coordinating them.
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such virtual process can be imagined to take only one instant of  ‘real’
time to carry its effects through. As a consequence, the sort of  equilib-
rium which is supported by this adjustment process can be interpreted
as an ‘instantaneous’ equilibrium, that is, an equilibrium referred to that
instant of  ‘real time’ in which one can observe (or infer) the data on
which the equilibrium itself  depends. On the contrary, since the actual
tâtonnement in production develops in the same ‘real’ time set as that
over which the economy evolves, under the assumption, however, that
the data remain unaltered over such ‘real’ time set, the sort of  equili -
brium which is supported by this adjustment process can be  interpreted
as a ‘stationary’ equilibrium, that is, an equilibrium referring to the
whole (potentially infinite) sequence of  ‘real’ time instants in each of
which one can observe (or infer) the unchanging data on which the
equilibrium itself  depends.
We can conclude, therefore, that the production model of  the second
edition of  the Eléments does not rule out a stationary interpretation of
the equilibrium concept. In effect, as already anticipated in the intro-
ductory section, Cassel, in putting forward his own simplified version
of  Walras’s production model, wholeheartedly embraces such an in-
terpretation (1932, ch. 4). The ensuing Walras-Cassel model will then
powerfully contribute to the diffusion of  the stationary equilibrium in-
terpretation of  Walras’s own theory.
As for Walras himself, he seems to be quite uncertain as to which
 interpretation to espouse. Take, in particular, the following passage
where Walras (1988, 308, 2-3) explains what will happen when the tâton-
nement in production is eventually finished:
[Les entrepreneurs] pourront ou s’acquitter et en rester là, ou plutôt continuer
 indéfiniment la production dont la marche sera dès lors réglée pour autant qu’au-
cune variation ne surviendra dans les données […].
Here Walras appears to oscillate between a purely instrumental and a
more substantive reading of  the assumption of  stationarity of  the data
in the ‘real’ time set: in the first case, the only use of  the assumption
would be to justify the establishment of  an equilibrium, which is not
supposed to really last over time; in the second case, instead, the even-
tually reached stationary equilibrium would describe an authentically
stationary economy, repeating itself  indefinitely over time.
Walras’s ambiguity as to the interpretation of  the equilibrium con-
cept employed in the production model of  the second edition of  the Elé-
ments surely depends on the coexistence of  two alternative interpreta-
tions of  the equilibrium concept in that edition, and even in that same
model. But there is also another reason for Walras’s oscillations, which
will be explained in the next section.
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5. Equilibrium and tâtonnement in the first two editions
of the Eléments: capital formation
As already remarked in section 2, since the first edition of  the Eléments
Walras puts forward a third model, more comprehensive in scope than
both the exchange and the production model: such third model is the
model of  capital formation, whose aim is to extend the equilibrium
analysis to a new set of  variables, that is, prices and produced quantities
of  newly produced capital goods as well as the so called ‘rate of  net in-
come’ («taux du revenu net»).1 Moreover, since the first edition the
analysis of  the tâtonnement is extended to this model with a view to ex-
plaining how the equilibrium values of  all the variables, including the
newly introduced ones, are reached on the market by means of  the tâ-
tonnement process.
The tâtonnement associated to the model with capital formation en-
genders a number of  specific problems, adding to those already point-
ed out. Yet we intend here to focus attention on one new problem on-
ly, directly concerning the interpretation of  the tâtonnement construct
and the equilibrium concept.
Newly produced capital goods present both similarities and dissimi-
larities with consumers’ goods: the similarity lies in that newly pro-
duced capital goods, exactly like consumers’ goods, are the outcome of
a production process; the dissimilarity, on the contrary, is due to the fact
that, unlike consumers’ goods, newly produced capital goods outlast
their first use, that is, they render a whole stream of  services over time
– it is precisely this property that makes them «capitaux», instead of
«revenus», in Walras’s sense (1988, 280).
As we have seen in the previous section, in the second edition of  the
Eléments, in contrasting the tâtonnement in production with the tâton-
nement in exchange, Walras points out that the mere fact that in the pro-
duction model consumers’ goods are regarded as the result of  a pro-
duction process, rather than being taken as given endowments as it
happens in the exchange model, forces the theorist to develop an analy-
sis of  the tâtonnement in production which is necessarily different from
the analysis of  the tâtonnement in exchange. But what applies to pro-
1 The «rate of  net income» in Walras’s sense coincides with the common ratio of  the net
price of  the service of  any newly produced capital good to the price of  the same capital good.
The net price of  a service, in turn, is obtained by subtracting from the price of  that service the
unit depreciation and insurance premiums on the corresponding capital good, which are tak-
en by Walras as proportional to the price of  the same capital good. The assumptions underly-
ing this definition, as well as the whole model of  capital formation, are questionable and have
indeed been repeatedly questioned over time. But these problems need not retain us here, for
they are irrelevant for our present purposes.
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duced consumers’ goods, also applies, according to Walras (1988, 377, 2-
5), to newly produced capital goods as well:
Dans la capitalisation, du reste, il y a transformation des services en capitaux neufs,
comme dans la production il y a transformation des services en produits. Un certain
taux du revenu net et certains prix des services étant criés, et certaines quantités de
produits et de capitaux neufs étant fabriquées, si ce taux, ces prix et ces quantités ne
sont pas taux, prix et quantités d’équilibre, il faut non seulement crier un autre taux
et d’autres prix, mais fabriquer d’autres quantités de produits et de capitaux neufs.
The problems posed by the tâtonnement relative to the production of
new capital goods, being similar to the problems posed by the tâton-
nement relative to the production of  consumers’ goods, must be con-
fronted in a similar way. Hence, in the second edition of  the Eléments,
also as far as the production of  new capital goods is concerned, Walras
postulates the occurrence of  a tâtonnement process in ‘real’ time, taking
place in a stationary economy that identically repeats itself  period after
period, where, as in the production model, a ‘period’ in the history of
the economy is supposed to coincide with a ‘round’ of  the tâtonnement
process:
Acceptant cette nécessité, nous devons supposer que, pour chaque reprise du tâton-
nement, nos entrepreneurs de produits et de capitaux neufs trouveront, dans le pays,
des propriétaires fonciers, travailleurs et capitalistes possédant les mêmes quantités
de services, ayant les mêmes besoins des services et des produits et les mêmes dis-
positions à l’épargne.
(Walras 1988, 376, 2-3)
Yet, by focussing attention on the similarities between produced capital
goods and produced consumers’ goods, Walras ends up by overlooking
that there exists a fundamental difference between the two types of
commodities, a difference that he himself  emphasizes elsewhere in the
Eléments: for, as already recalled, capital goods are durables, surviving
their first use, while consumers’ goods are nondurables, perishing with
their first use; shortly, capital goods are storable stocks, while con-
sumers’ goods are unstorable flows. Hence, the economy investigated
in the model with capital formation, unlike the economy analyzed in
the production model, is not a pure flow economy: rather, it is an econ-
omy where both stocks and flows can be produced.
However, if  actual production is allowed to take place out of  equi-
librium in the tâtonnement relative to the production of  new capital
goods, as Walras would have us to believe, the newly produced capital
goods add up to the already existing capital goods, necessarily chang-
ing the endowments of  capital goods, hence also the quantities of  the
services they render. In short, in an economy where storable goods
can actually be produced, an endogenous source of  change in the da-
ta of  the economy is at work which makes it illegitimate to assume
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the invariance of  the data in the ‘real’ time over which the economy
evolves.1
To sum up on this point, in the second edition of  the Eléments Walras
extends the assumption of  an actual tâtonnement process, taking place
in ‘real’ time under the assumption of  stationary data, from the pro-
duction model to the model with capital formation; in the latter mod-
el, however, such assumption, as well as the ensuing stationary inter-
pretation of  the equilibrium notion, becomes self-contradictory. Walras
might easily have realized the absurdity of  extending the assumption of
stationary data to the model with capital formation, had he recalled
what he himself  had written on this point a few years before:
Pour avoir une offre, une demande et des prix de capitaux, il faut substituer à la
conception d’un état économique stationnaire celle d’un état économique progressif.
(Walras 1988, 350, 1-3)
In effect, Walras seems sometimes to perceive that there is something
wrong with a stationary model where capital goods can actually be pro-
duced, even out of  equilibrium. In effect, in explaining what will hap-
pen in the economy when the tâtonnement is eventually finished, he
writes:
La production et la capitalisation pourront alors continuer, mais, bien entendu, avec
les changements provenant de l’existence des capitaux neufs.
(Walras 1988, 376, 2-3)
When literally taken, this statement would imply that capital goods,
newly produced during the various rounds of  the tâtonnement process
in ‘real’ time, can only be used when the tâtonnement is finished. But
what is the point in producing new capital goods, which can be stored
somewhere in the economy, but cannot be used till the end of  the tâ-
tonnement, lest the data of  the economy should change?
6. Equilibrium and tâtonnement in the fourth edition
of the Eléments
After the publication of  the second edition of  the Eléments (or, for that
matter, the third, which is almost identical to the second in this respect),
Walras’s theory of  equilibrium and tâtonnement is still left in a quite un-
1 This is the reason why Varian 1984, 247, in the passage quoted above in the text, after dis-
tinguishing between the two types of  tâtonnement (the virtual one, in ‘logical’ time, and the ac-
tual one, in ‘real’ time), continues as follows:
The first story makes sense if  goods are stocks or flows, but the second makes sense  only
if  the goods are flow goods. For if  stock goods are available, unsold goods will accumu-
late and endowments will change from day to day. This change in endowments will
 presumably affect agents’ demands and supplies.
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satisfactory status: in fact, it is marred by a number of  epistemological
and theoretical inconsistencies, giving rise to true and proper analytical
mistakes. Among the epistemological inconsistencies, the most evident
is revealed by the dualistic character of  Walras’s theoretical system: for
in this system, as expounded in the just mentioned editions of  the Elé-
ments, one can find, side by side, two alternative interpretations of  the
tâtonnement, the virtual and the actual one, taking place in two different
time sets, the ‘logical’ and the ‘real’ one, supporting two alternative no-
tions of  equilibrium, the ‘instantaneous’ and the ‘stationary’ one, and
referring to different models, the exchange model, on the one hand, and
the models of  production and capital formation, on the other (with the
aggravating circumstance that each of  the last two models encompass-
es a sort of  exchange sub-model, or better a number of  such sub-mod-
els, obeying an adjustment rule and exhibiting a tâtonnement process
that are different from the rule and process characterizing the larger en-
compassing model). Among the analytical inconsistencies, the most se-
rious ones are perhaps the following two: first, the impossibility of  even
starting the tâtonnement processes concerning production (of  both con-
sumers’ and capital goods), due to the unenforceability of  unintended
actions in an economy based on voluntary exchange; second, the logi-
cal impossibility of  assuming the invariance of  the data in ‘real’ time in
the model with capital formation.
All the problems appear to arise from the attempt, still made by Wal-
ras in the second and third edition of  the Eléments, to preserve a degree
of  realism in the analysis of  the tâtonnement processes concerning pro-
duction, when he had already abandoned any claim to realism  (granting
he had laid any such claim before) in the analysis of  the tâtonnement
process in exchange. By ‘realistic’ we mean here an analysis of  the tâ-
tonnement process trying to model it as an actual, observable, essential
disequilibrium process in ‘real’ time: exactly what Walras is still striving
to do in the second and third edition as far as production is concerned.
But Walras’s efforts are not crowned with success: even putting aside
all the inconsistencies mentioned above, and confining attention to the
less controversial side of  Walras’s theory, one has to conclude that the
results he gets on the mere ground of  realism are very modest indeed.
Let us take the production model, where at least the stationarity as-
sumption is not logically inconsistent. Not even with respect to this
model is Walras capable of  producing a real theory of  observable dise-
quilibrium behavior. We are indeed told that such observable disequi-
librium behavior can actually take place during the tâtonnement process,
but we are not given any theoretical hint on how to predict it: such be-
havior may well be observable, but it remains unpredictable in Walras’s
world. Moreover, even if  it were predictable, any effort to predict it
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would be misplaced: for, as we have seen above, such disequilibrium be-
havior is necessarily inessential, as it cannot affect the data; hence there
is no point in predicting it.
As can be seen, the doubtful gains in terms of  realism are far from
sufficient to compensate the serious consistency losses caused by the
survival of  a ‘real’ time interpretation of  the tâtonnement processes con-
cerning production. So, when Walras, in preparing his last comprehen-
sive revision of  the Eléments, makes a final effort to polish his theory of
the tâtonnement, his course of  action is practically traced out: what he
has to do is just to remorselessly suppress any sort of  realistic pretence
in the analysis of  the tâtonnement processes concerning production.
This is what Walras does by means of  the so-called «hypothèse des
bons», which is discussed in three different places in the fourth edition
of  the Eléments: in Leçon 20, «Equations de la production»; in Leçon 24,
«Equations de la capitalisation et du crédit»; and, finally, in Leçon 29,
«Equations de la circulation et de la monnaie». In the first two Leçons
Walras corrects his previous treatment of  the tâtonnement in the pro-
duction of  consumers’ and capital goods, respectively; in the last one,
which is one of  the few completely new parts of  the fourth edition,
Walras systematically expounds his final view concerning statics, dy-
namics, tâtonnement, and equilibrium.1
The «hypothèse des bons» is first introduced towards the end of  Leçon
20, immediately after the passage, preserved without change since the
second edition and already quoted in section 4 above, where Walras
contrasts the tâtonnement in exchange, where all that is required is a
mere change in prices, with the tâtonnement in production, where in-
stead an actual transformation of  inputs into outputs is involved in the
process. As will be recalled, this difference gives rise to a special diffi-
culty that, according to Walras, is peculiar to the tâtonnement in pro-
duction. As we have seen in section 4, in the second edition of  the Elé-
1 While the most exhaustive and compelling statement of  the consequences of  assuming
the «hypothèse des bons» on the time structure of  equilibrium analysis can be found in Leçon
29 of  the fourth edition of  the Eléments, i.e., in the first of  the two lessons of  that edition where
Walras eventually puts forward a formal model of  circulating capital and money, viewed as an
integral part of  his general equilibrium theory, the introduction of  that «hypothèse» has hard-
ly anything to do with either the model with circulating capital and money per se or, more
specifically, with the tâtonnement process especially devised by Walras with reference to that
model. As a matter of  fact, a highly questionable assumption about the allegedly dicothomic
(or almost dicothomic) charater of  the economy, an assumption explicitly made by Walras in
Leçon 30 of  the fourth edition of  the Eléments (1988, 465, 4-5), allows him to treat the tâtonnement
process underlying the model with circulating capital and money as if  it simply were a slight-
ly modified version of  the tâtonnement process underlying the model with capital formation.
From Walras’s own viewpoint, therefore, no further special difficulties can arise from the tâ-
tonnement process associated with the model with circulating capital and money, on top of  the
difficulties already implicit in the models with production and capital formation of  the second
and third editions of  the Eléments.
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ments such a difficulty is taken care of  by introducing an assumption of
stationarity of  the economic data, hence of  the tâtonnement process in
‘real’ time. In the fourth edition, the passage containing the stationari-
ty assumption is bodily replaced by the following one, introducing an
alternative assumption, precisely, the «hypothèse des bons»:
Pour réaliser un tâtonnement rigoureux en matière de production comme en matière
d’échange, tout en tenant compte de cette circonstance, il n’y a qu’à supposer les en-
trepreneurs représentant par des bons des quantités successives de produits détermi-
nées d’abord au hasard puis en augmentation ou diminution suivant qu’il y aura ex-
cédent du prix de vente sur le prix de revient ou réciproquement, jusqu’à égalité de
ces deux prix; et les propriétaires fonciers, travailleurs et capitalistes représentant de
même par des bons des quantités successives de services à des prix criés d’abord au ha-
sard puis en hausse ou baisse suivant qu’il y aura excédent de la demande sur l’offre
ou réciproquement, jusqu’à égalité de l’une et de l’autre.
(Walras 1988, 309, 4-5)1
Though the above passage does not satisfy ideal standards of  rigor and
completeness,2 its general import is all the same perfectly clear: the pur-
pose of  the «hypothèse des bons» is simply to turn an actual process in-
volving observable disequilibrium in ‘real’ time, namely, the tâton-
nement in production of  the second edition, into a virtual process
involving unobservable disequilibrium in ‘logical’ time, namely, the
new tâtonnement in production of  the fourth edition. To this end the
«hypothèse des bons» effectively provides the conclusive answer: in the
previous editions, as we have seen, the virtual character of  the tâton-
nement in exchange coexisted with the actual character of  the tâton-
nement in production (of  both consumers’ and capital goods); in the
fourth  edition, instead, by means of  the «hypothèse des bons», which ap-
plies to the tâtonnement in production (of  both consumers’ and capital
goods), all sorts of  tâtonnement processes take on the same virtual na-
ture already characterizing the tâtonnement process in exchange.
In the light of  our previous observations, the severe criticisms levelled
at the above quoted passage, particularly by Hicks and Patinkin, appear
1 A very similar passage can be found in the fourth edition of  the Eléments towards the end
of  Leçon 24, where the «hypothèse des bons» is introduced with reference to the production of
new capital goods (Walras 1988, 377, 4-5). Also in this case the passage concerned replaces a
passage dating back to the second edition, quoted in section 5 above, where Walras had intro-
duced an assumption of  stationarity of  the economic data, hence of  the tâtonnement process in
‘real’ time, in order to take care of  the allegedly peculiar difficulty concerning the tâtonnement
in the production of  new capital goods.
2 In particular Walras forgets to explicitly mention, among the quantities that should be rep-
resented by means of  bons during the newly devised tâtonnement process, the quantities of  con-
sumers’ goods demanded by the consumers as well as the quantities of  services demanded by
the entrepreneurs. The reason for such oversight, which can anyhow be easily corrected by any
unprejudiced reader, is probably related to the twisted history of  this passage, which is insert-
ed into a pre-existing context which is left unaltered otherwise.
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basically unfounded. Patinkin (1956, 378-380) objects that, by applying
the «hypothèse des bons» to the tâtonnement in production only, and by
forgetting to extend a similar assumption to the tâtonnement in  exchange,
Walras gives rise to an asymmetry between the two types of  tâton-
nement, which is unjustifiable from a logical point of  view. But Patinkin’s
argument is really based on a misunderstanding: for, as we have seen, at
the time of  the introduction of  the «hypothèse des bons», Walras had al-
ready been adopting for a long time a virtual interpretation of  the tâ-
tonnement in exchange; so that the application of  the «hypothèse des
bons» to the tâtonnement in production in the fourth edition has the effect
of  restoring a broken symmetry between the two types of  tâtonnement,
exactly the opposite of  Patinkin’s assertion. Hicks’s criticism is even
more ferocious, given that he qualifies the above passage as «rather pa-
thetic» (Hicks 1934, 346, fn. 19). The reason for such a contemptuous ep-
ithet is that, when writing his 1934 paper, Hicks is still personally leaning
towards a ‘stationary’ interpretation of  the equilibrium concept (1934,
343, 346); and he realizes that Walras’s «hypothèse des bons», by general-
izing the assumption of  a virtual tâtonnement in ‘logical’ time to the
whole economy, strikes a fatal blow to the ‘stationary’ interpretation of
the equilibrium concept in favor of  the ‘instantaneous’ one.1
The last remarks lead us eventually to consider the general implica-
tions of  the adoption of  the «hypothèse des bons», implications which are
systematically stated by Walras himself  in the compact methodological
passage contained in Leçon 29 of  the fourth edition of  the Eléments:
Au moyen de l’hypothèse des bons, on peut distinguer nettement, surtout si l’on les
suppose successives, les trois phases suivantes:
1º La phase des tâtonnements préliminaires en vue de l’établissement de l’équilibre en
principe;
2º La phase statique de l’établissement effectif  ab ovo de l’équilibre relatif  à la livraison
des services producteurs et des produits pendant la période de temps considérée,
aux conditions convenues, sans changements dans les données du problème;
3º Une phase dynamique de trouble continuel de l’équilibre par des changements dans
ces données et de rétablissement continuel de l’équilibre ainsi troublé.
En conséquence de ces définitions, il doit être bien entendu que les capitaux neufs,
fixes ou circulants, qui seront livrés pendant la seconde phase, ne fonctionneront que
dans la troisième phase, constituant ainsi un premier changement dans les données
du  problème.
(Walras 1988, 447, 449, 4-5)
1 A few years later, without acknowledging it explicitly, Hicks will change his mind about
what should be regarded as the most appropriate equilibrium concept or the most acceptable
tâtonnement process. In fact, in Value and Capital (1939, 122 ff.), Hicks will envisage an adjustment
process, based on the famous distinction «Monday»-«week», which is nothing but a rewriting,
in a pseudo-realistic, Marshallian language, of  Walras’s virtual tâtonnement process, a process
based inter alia on that «hypothèse des bons» that Hicks had qualified as «pathetic» only five
years before. Moreover, Hicks’s newly discovered notion of  «temporary equilibrium» is noth-
ing but a specialization of  Walras’s notion of  ‘instantaneous’ equilibrium.
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The time structure of  Walras’s analysis comes out very clearly of  the
above passage, which dispels all possible doubts concerning the nature
of  the economy that Walras intends to take as the object of  his theo-
retical investigations. In modern language, the economy that Walras
wants to study is a competitive sequence economy, that is, an economy
where markets open sequentially over time and the agents of  the econ-
omy make their choices at any time at which the markets open.
More precisely, the economy envisaged by Walras evolves over a
chronologically ordered sequence of  non-degenerate connected time
intervals of  equal length, which may be called dates, covering the whole
real line. The time length of  each date is arbitrary, but to fix ideas it may
be convenient, following Walras (1988, 577, 4-5), to suppose that a date
lasts just one year. Let t be the initial instant of  the corresponding date.
Then we can let t ∈ , where  is the set of  the integers. To each in-
stant t ∈ there corresponds the half-open interval [t, t + 1), which can
be identified with date t. Each instant t ∈ is characterized by a certain
array of  data, which remain unchanged over the whole date t.
In the initial instant of  each date t a virtual tâtonnement process takes
place, allowing the economy to instantaneously reach the equilibrium
corresponding to the data prevailing at instant t. By using the expression
«tâtonnements préliminaires» Walras makes it clear that the tâtonnement
process he is envisaging here develops in a ‘logical’ time set and takes
just one instant of  ‘real’ time to carry its effects through. The equilibri-
um supported by such virtual tâtonnement process in ‘logical’ time is ‘in-
stantaneous’ in nature; more precisely, since the economy under inves-
tigation is a sequence economy, each ‘instantaneous’ equilibrium
associated with the initial instant of  a particular date takes the nature
of  a «temporary» equilibrium, in Hicks’s sense. The evolution of  the
economy over time can then be described by means of  a chronologi-
cally ordered sequence of  «temporary» equilibria: Walras (1988, 447) de-
notes such a descriptive procedure by the expression «équilibre variable
ou mobile». No assumption of  stationarity of  the data, hence of  the se-
quence of  «temporary» equilibria, is either necessary or logically possi-
ble, and no such assumption is in effect made by Walras.
No specific limitation as to the nature of  the commodities that can be
traded or produced in the economy needs to be imposed here: in par-
ticular both flows and stocks can be the object of  economic activity. At
the initial instant of  any given date t, given the equilibrium prices in-
stantaneously reached at t by means of  the «tâtonnements préliminaires»
in ‘logical’ time, the agents optimally choose their equilibrium plans of
action (trade, consumption, and production plans) that, being mutual-
ly compatible, can all be actually carried out. According to Walras, the
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«phase statique», spanning the whole date, precisely consists in the exe-
cution of  the equilibrium plans of  action. The quantities of  flow goods
and services whose delivery is implied by the equilibrium plans are ac-
tually delivered and used during the whole time span of  the date. The
quantities of  newly produced capital goods, instead, may well be deliv-
ered during the time span of  the date, but cannot be used until the first
instant of  the subsequent date:1 such quantities represent the first (en-
dogenous) source of  change in the data of  the economy. According to
Walras, the ‘dynamic phase’ consists precisely in the change in the da-
ta, which is supposed to take place at the initial instant of  each date.
Hence, the «phase dynamique» is no less instantaneous than the «phase
des tâtonnements préliminaires»: as a matter of  fact, from a temporal
(though not a logical) point of  view, the two phases necessarily coin-
cide, since they unavoidably overlap at the initial instant of  each date.
This construction is no doubt artificial and contrived, but it can take
care of  all the analytical problems left unsolved by the previous editions
of  the Eléments: in particular, no unintended disequilibrium action
needs to be enforced, since no observable disequilibrium behavior is al-
lowed to take place; no self-contradictory assumption mars the capital
formation model, since no stationarity assumption is any longer re-
quired. Further, some of  the epistemological problems besieging the
previous editions of  the Eléments disappear as well: in particular, the dis-
turbing coexistence of  two different equilibrium concepts, the ‘instan-
taneous’ and the ‘stationary’ one, is no longer required in Walras’s final
comprehensive model, since in that model the ‘instantaneous’ notion is
the only one to survive. The price to be paid, in terms of  loss of  de-
scriptive realism and predictive power, for finally getting rid of  all the
surviving remnants of  the ‘stationary’ interpretations of  both the tâ-
tonnement construct and the equilibrium concept is not high, after all;
but indeed the price to be paid is low essentially because the gains grant-
ed by the previous pseudo-realistic interpretations of  the tâtonnement
and the equilibrium concept were almost insignificant. Not irrelevant,
instead, is the methodological cost associated with the generalization
of  the idea of  an ‘instantaneous’ tâtonnement process: as a matter of  fact,
the very idea of  an ‘instantaneous process’, which simply reflects the co-
existence in the same analytical framework of  two distinct time con-
cepts (the ‘logical’ time of  the virtual tâtonnement process and the ‘real’
time of  the actual economic process), is very hard to swallow, for it may
legitimately appear as a true and proper contradiction in terms. But this
1 In modern language, therefore, one would say that the quantities of  the capital goods that
are newly produced during a certain date are in effect contracted for forward delivery, at the
initial instant of  the subsequent date.
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is a cost that Walras is willing to pay in the end, especially in view of  his
unswerving faith in the speed and effectiveness of  the market in pro-
viding its «solution pratique»: for, if  the competitive markets are indeed
so quick and reliable in delivering their «solution» that the equilibrium
prices can be reached «en quelques minutes», as Walras (1988, 93) ap-
parently believes, then to suppose that the equilibration process be ‘in-
stantaneous’ cannot appear, after all, as an unbearable distortion of
what happens in the real world.
7. Conclusions
Over the long time period elapsed since the appearance, in 1874, of  the
first installment of  the first edition of  Walras’s Eléments, two alternative
interpretations of  the equilibrium notion employed by Walras in his
magnum opus have been recurrently suggested by scholars and theorists
conversant with both Walras’s work and the history of  general equilib-
rium theory: a stationary equilibrium interpretation, first advocated by
Wicksell and later popularized by Cassel’s influential reformulation of
Walras’s production model, and a temporary equilibrium interpreta-
tion, first embraced by Pareto and the small group of  Walras’s imme-
diate followers and much later defended, in the context of  formalized
reconstructions of  Walras’s theory, by Morishima and others in the last
quarter of  the twentieth century. Such persistent oscillations in the in-
terpretation of  Walras’s equilibrium concept lead one to suspect that
some ambiguity or inconsistency may possibly exist within Walras’s
original formulation of  general equilibrium theory in the Eléments and
related writings. In this paper we have explored this conjecture fo-
cussing, in particular, on the relationship between the theory of  the tâ-
tonnement, regarded by Walras as an essential part of  his equilibrium ap-
proach, and Walras’s own interpretation of  the equilibrium concept as
employed in the Eléments.
The theory of  the tâtonnement is probably the part of  the Eléments
which undergoes the most frequent and radical revisions over the years.
Hence, our first task in this paper has been to explain how such theory
evolves over the four editions of  the Eléments published during Walras’s
lifetime (1874-1877, 1889, 1896, 1900). Moreover, since Walras develops a
special version of  the tâtonnement for each of  the four nested equilibri-
um models put forward in the Eléments (exchange, production, capital
formation, circulation and money), it has been necessary to separately
analyze the evolution of  the tâtonnement construct with reference to
each model in turn.
As regards the model of  exchange, we have shown that, after a some-
what naïve handling of  the disequilibrium process in the first edition of
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the Eléments (1874), Walras makes his analysis much more precise in the
second edition (1889), by explicitly introducing a ‘no trade out of  equi-
librium’ assumption. By virtue of  this assumption, since the second edi-
tion of  the Eléments the tâtonnement process in exchange becomes a vir-
tual process, where no observable disequilibrium behavior is allowed to
occur. Hence, while the tâtonnement process in exchange must be sup-
posed to take place in a purely ‘logical’ time, distinct from the ‘real’ time
over which the economy evolves, the associated equilibrium, suppos-
edly reached in one single instant of  ‘real’ time, becomes ‘instanta-
neous’ in nature.
Concerning the production model, however, we have shown that, for
a much longer period, Walras keeps faithful to his original assumption
that disequilibrium production entails observable behavior, taking
place in ‘real’ time and producing actual consequences. This assump-
tion – which of  course, from the second edition onwards, cannot be eas-
ily reconciled with the coexisting treatment of  tâtonnement in exchange
– gives also rise to further specific difficulties, which Walras desperate-
ly endeavors to overcome over the years: to this end, in the first edition
he makes the unpalatable assumption of  the existence of  a ‘foreign mar-
ket’, accommodating all ‘domestic’ quantitative disequilibrium; in the
second edition, instead, while giving up all recourse to an external deus
ex machina, he resorts to the alternative assumption that the economy
under question is a stationary economy, identically repeating itself  pe-
riod after period under unchanging conditions. When applied to the
production model, this assumption gives rise to the prototype of  the
stationary equilibrium model, later resumed under the species of  the
Walras-Cassel model, on which the stationary interpretation of  Wal-
ras’s equilibrium theory is actually founded. Yet, when applied to the
capital formation model, as Walras tries to do, the stationarity assump-
tion turns out to be self-contradictory. In view of  this, in trying to rem-
edy the difficulties and contradictions engendered by his previous treat-
ment of  the tâtonnement in production and capital formation, in the
fourth edition (1900) Walras eventually makes a new assumption,
known as the «hypothèse des bons», with the purpose of  extending to
the tâtonnement in production and capital formation those same features
(virtuality, unobservability, evolution in a merely ‘logical’ time set) that
had already been characterizing the tâtonnement in exchange for a long
time, namely, since the appearance of  the second edition of  the Elé-
ments. In this new context, all stationarity assumptions can and must be
dropped, so that the equilibrium notion emerging from a generalized
virtual tâtonnement process, in both exchange and production and capi-
tal formation, cannot but be of  the ‘instantaneous’, specifically «tem-
porary», type.
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The twisted history of  the tâtonnement construct, hence of  the equi-
librium concept, over the various editions of  the Eléments can thus help
explain the recurrent oscillations in the interpretation of  Walras’s equi-
librium notion that can be found in the literature. From our recon-
struction it appears that the stationary equilibrium interpretation,
which has been playing such an important role in the subsequent his-
tory of  general equilibrium theory, can indeed be traced back to the sta-
tionarity  assumption made by Walras in the second edition of  the Elé-
ments, in the attempt to overcome the serious difficulties arising from
his own original assumption of  a ‘real’ time, observable disequilibrium
tâtonnement process in production. Yet, as we have also shown, Walras
himself  eventually realizes that only a virtual tâtonnement process in
‘logical’ time is consistent with the basic assumptions underlying his
comprehensive model, so that, in the last analysis, the ‘instantaneous’
equilibrium notion is the only one to pass the internal consistency test
and consequently to survive in the last edition of  the Eléments during
Walras’s lifetime.
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